Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, February 1, 2025

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, February 1, 2025

Christina Harward, Olivia Gibson, Davit Gasparyan, Nicole Wolkov, and Frederick W. Kagan

February 1, 2025, 3pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of Ukraine’s offensive in Kursk Oblast.

Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 11:30am ET on February 1. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the February 2 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Russian forces conducted a large-scale series of drone and missile strikes against Ukraine on the night of January 31 to February 1. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched seven Iskander-M/KN-23 ballistic missiles from Voronezh Oblast and occupied Crimea; seven Iskander-K cruise missiles from occupied Crimea and Donetsk Oblast; eight Kh-22 cruise missiles from Tu-22M3 aircraft; eight Kh-101/55 cruise missiles from Tu-95MS strategic bombers; 10 Kh-59/69 cruise missiles from tactical aircraft over Voronezh Oblast; two Kh-31P anti-radiation missiles from the Black Sea; and 123 Shahed and decoy drones from Bryansk, Kursk, and Oryol oblasts; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai, and occupied Cape Chauda, Crimea.[1] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces shot down 56 Shahed and decoy drones; that 61 drones were “lost,” likely due to Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) interference; and that Ukrainian countermeasures prevented an unspecified but significant number of Russian missiles from reaching their targets. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian ballistic missiles had a higher success rate, and ISW continues to assess that Russian forces are likely leveraging ballistic missiles in strike packages since Ukraine only has a few air defense systems suitable for intercepting such missiles.[2] Ukrainian officials, including Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky, reported that a Russian Kh-22 missile struck a residential building in Poltava City; that Russian ballistic missiles struck the historical center of Odesa City, and damaged a United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) protected building; and that drones damaged residential areas, warehouses, and private property in Kharkiv and Kyiv oblasts.[3] The Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs confirmed that Russian forces struck an area near where Norwegian diplomats were staying in Odesa City.[4] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russia’s overnight strikes targeted Ukrainian gas and energy facilities that support the Ukrainian defense industrial base (DIB).[5]

A recent Russian drone strike on a Ukrainian naval drone suggests that Russian forces have developed a new method to offset Ukrainian capabilities in the Black Sea. The Russian MoD reported on February 1 that Russia’s Black Sea Fleet (BSF) used a drone to destroy a Ukrainian naval drone in the Black Sea.[6] Russian milbloggers claimed that the Russian BSF launched a Kronshtadt Orion missile-capable drone from an unspecified naval asset and that this strike may be the first documented case of Russian forces leveraging a naval asset to deploy drones capable of destroying Ukrainian naval drones.[7] Another Russian milblogger called on Russian authorities to increase the production of weapons similar to the drone-launched X-UAV missiles (TKB-1030) to effectively combat Ukrainian forces’ naval drone capabilities as it is now too risky for Russia to operate helicopters near the Black Sea.[8] Ukrainian forces have demonstrated their ability to down Russian Mi-8 helicopters operating over the Black Sea using missiles launched from Magura V5 naval strike drones, and the February 1 BSF strike suggests that Russian forces have developed a new method to try to offset this Ukrainian naval drone adaptation.[9]

Key Takeaways:

• Russian forces conducted a large-scale series of drone and missile strikes against Ukraine on the night of January 31 to February 1.
• A recent Russian drone strike on a Ukrainian naval drone suggests that Russian forces have developed a new method to offset Ukrainian capabilities in the Black Sea.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Toretsk, and Russian forces recently advanced near Chasiv Yar, Pokrovsk, and Kurakhove.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

• Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
• Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
• Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
• Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
• Russian Technological Adaptations
• Activities in Russian-occupied areas
• Significant Activity in Belarus

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Ukrainian salient in Kursk Oblast on February 1 but did not make any confirmed advances. Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced near Guyevo (south of Sudzha), Sverdlikovo (northwest of Sudzha), and Nikolayevo-Darino (east of Sudzha); 400 meters near Kurilovka; and more than 150 meters in Makhnovka (both south of Sudzha), but ISW has not observed confirmation of these claims.[10] The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in Kursk Oblast stated that Russian forces are increasing guided glide bomb strikes against Kursk Oblast.[11] The spokesperson stated that Ukrainian forces recently destroyed about 19 Russian heavy and light armored vehicles during an unsuccessful Russian attack, after which Russian forces switched to attacking in small infantry groups. Elements of the Russian BARS-Kursk volunteer detachment are reportedly operating in Korenevsky Raion; elements of the “Pyatnashka” International Volunteer Brigade are reportedly operating in Kursk Oblast; elements of the Chechen Akhmat Spetsnaz “Kashtan” Detachment are reportedly operating near Berdin (northeast of Sudzha); and elements of the 83rd Airborne (VDV) Brigade are reportedly operating near Nikolayevo-Darino.[12]

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)

Russian forces continued limited offensive operations near Vovchansk (northeast of Kharkiv City) on January 31 and February 1.[13] The Ukrainian General Staff published a map on February 1 indicating that Russian forces recently advanced to northern Zelene (north of Kharkiv City).[14]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction on February 1. The Ukrainian General Staff published a map on February 1 indicating that Russian forces recently advanced west of Orlyanka (east of Kupyansk).[15] A Russian source claimed that Russian forces seized Dvorichna (north of Kupyansk), but ISW has not observed confirmation of this claim.[16] Russian forces conducted offensive operations northeast of Kupyansk and along the international border near Topoli; north of Kupyansk near Dvorichna; east of Kupyansk near Petropavlivka and Stepova Novoselivka; and south of Kupyansk near Hlushkivka on January 31 and February 1.[17] A Russian source claimed that Ukrainian forces unsuccessfully counterattacked near Dvorichna.[18] A spokesperson for a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Kupyansk direction stated that Russian infantry attacked in groups of two to 30 personnel.[19] The spokesperson stated that Russian forces first attack with less trained infantry who identify Ukrainian firing positions, after which better trained infantry attack on Ukrainian forces’ flanks. A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces maintain positions on the northern and western outskirts of Novomlynsk (northeast of Kupyansk and Dvorichna).[20] Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets stated that Ukrainian forces also maintain positions in northern Zapadne (north of Kupyansk and southwest of Dvorichna).[21] Mashovets stated that elements of the Russian 69th Motorized Rifle Division (6th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Leningrad Military District [LMD]), reinforced by elements of the Russian Volunteer Corps, are operating near Dvorichna and Zapadne.

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Borova direction on February 1 but did not make any confirmed advances. A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced west of Makiivka (southeast of Borova), but ISW has not observed confirmation of this claim.[22] Russian forces conducted offensive operations northeast of Borova near Zahyrzove, Lovoza, Bohuslavka, and Pishchane and southeast of Borova near Novoyehorivka and Makiivka and towards Novomykhailivka on January 31 and February 1.[23] Mashovets stated that elements of the Russian 2nd Motorized Rifle Division and 47th Tank Division (both of the 1st Guards Tank Army [GTA], Moscow Military District [MMD]) are operating near Kruhlyakivka (northeast of Borova).[24] A Russian milblogger continued to claim that the Russian MoD’s January 20 claim that Russian forces seized Novoyehorivka is inaccurate and causing unnecessary losses among elements of the 84th Reconnaissance Battalion (20th CAA, MMD) that continue to attack the settlement.[25]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Lyman direction on February 1 but did not make any confirmed advances. A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced west of Terny (west of Lyman), Ivanivka, and Novosadove (both northwest of Lyman), but ISW has not observed confirmation of this claim.[26] Russian forces conducted offensive operations northeast of Lyman near Terny, Yampolivka and Kolodyazi and towards Zelena Dolyne and west of Lyman near Torske on January 31 and February 1.[27] Elements of the Russian 16th Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian General Staff’s Main Directorate [GRU]) are reportedly operating near the Serebryanske forest area east of Lyman.[28]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Siversk direction on February 1 but did not advance. Russian forces attacked northeast of Siversk near Bilohorivka, east of Siversk near Verkhnokamyanske, and southeast of Siversk near Spirne on January 31 and February 1.[29] Ukraine’s Khortytsia Group of Forces reported on February 1 that Russian forces conducted a mechanized assault of an unspecified echelon near Verkhnokamyanske and that Ukrainian forces damaged two armored fighting vehicles involved in the assault.[30] A Russian milblogger claimed on February 1 that difficult terrain and Ukrainian defenses are slowing Russian advances in Bilohorivka.[31] Ukrainian Luhansk Group of Forces Spokesperson Lieutenant Colonel Dmytro Zaporozhets stated on February 1 that Russian forces operating in the Siversk, Chasiv Yar, and Toretsk directions maintain the tactical reserves needed to conduct rotations.[32]

Russian forces recently advanced south of Chasiv Yar amid continued offensive operations in the area on February 1. Geolocated footage published on January 31 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced south of Chasiv Yar.[33] Russian forces conducted ground attacks near Chasiv Yar itself and south of Chasiv Yar near Block-9 mine, Stupochky, Bila Hora, and Predtechyne on January 31 and February 1.[34] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked in the Pivnichnyi Microraion (northern Chasiv Yar).[35] Elements of the Russian “Pyatnashka” International Volunteer Brigade; 88th “Hispaniola” Volunteer Brigade and Sever-V Brigade (both of the Russian Volunteer Corps); 3rd Airborne (VDV) Battalion and 1065th VDV Artillery Regiment (both of the 98th VDV Division) are reportedly operating in and near Chasiv Yar.[36]

Ukrainian forces recently advanced in northern Toretsk amid continued offensive operations in the area on February 1. Geolocated footage published on February 31 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced in northern Toretsk.[37] The Russian MoD claimed on January 31 that elements of the Russian 101st Separate Rifle Regiment (likely 132nd Motorized Rifle Brigade, formerly 1st Donetsk People’s Republic Army Corps [DNR AC], Southern Military District [SMD]) seized Krymske (north of Toretsk).[38] ISW currently does not assess that Russian forces have advanced in Krymske, however. Russian forces continued attacking near Toretsk and Krymske on January 31 and February 1.[39] An officer of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Toretsk direction stated on February 1 that the Russian command mostly deploys mobilized personnel from occupied Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts to attack in the area.[40] The officer noted that Russian forces occasionally commit well-equipped and trained assault groups from other unspecified areas of the frontline to assault operations in the Toretsk direction.

Russian forces recently advanced in the Pokrovsk direction amid continued offensive operations in the area on February 1. Geolocated footage published on January 30 and 31 indicates that Russian forces recently marginally advanced northwest of Kotlyne (west of Pokrovsk) and recently advanced on the northern outskirts of Nadiivka (southwest of Pokrovsk).[41] Russian forces continued attacking Pokrovsk itself; east of Pokrovsk near Zelene Pole, Vodyane Druhe, Yelyzavetivka, Promin, Novotoretske, and Myrolyubivka; southeast of Pokrovsk near Lysivka; and southwest of Pokrovsk near Sribne, Udachne, Uspenivka, Zvirove, Novooleksandrivka, and Kotlyarivka on January 31 and February 1.[42] Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets stated that elements of the 228th and 428th motorized rifle regiments, and 6th and 80th tank regiments (90 Tank Division, 41st Combined Arms Army [CAA], Central Military District [CMD]) are operating in the Nadiivka-Novoandriivka area.[43]

Russian forces recently advanced in the Kurakhove direction amid continued offensive operations in the area on February 1. Geolocated footage published on January 31 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced south of Rozlyv (southwest of Kurakhove).[44] Russian forces continued attacking west of Kurakhove near Dachne, Ulakly, Andriivka, and Kostyantynopil and southwest of Kurakhove near Rozdolne and Zelenivka on January 31 and February 1.[45] Mashovets stated that likely elements of the Russian 67th Rifle Regiment or 428th Motorized Rifle Regiment (both of the 90th Tank Division) are attacking Andriivka from the northeast and that elements of the 110th and 114th motorized rifle brigade (51st CAA) are attacking Andriivka from Shevchenko (just east of Andriivka).[46] Mashovets stated that elements of the Russian 36th Motorized Rifle Brigade (29th CAA, Eastern Military District [EMD]) and 39th Motorized Rifle Brigade (68th Army Corps, EMD) are attacking Dachne from the Zelenivka-Yantarne area (southwest of Kurakhove) and elements of the 20th and 150th motorized rifle divisions (8th CAA, SMD) are attacking Dachne from the east.

The Ukrainian General Staff published a map on February 1 indicating that Russian forces seized Velyka Novosilka.[47] Russian forces continued offensive operations west of Velyka Novosilka near Novosilka and southwest of Velyka Novosilka near Novopil on January 31 and February 1.[48] Elements of the Russian 3rd Battalion of the 394th Motorized Rifle Regiment (127th Motorized Rifle Division, 5th CAA, EMD) are reportedly operating near Velyka Novosilka.[49] Mashovets stated that elements of the Russian 40th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet, EMD) and 336th Naval Infantry Brigade (Baltic Fleet, Leningrad Military District [LMD]) are reportedly operating in the areas north through southwest of Velyka Novosilka.[50]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)

The Ukrainian General Staff published a map on February 1 indicating that Russian forces recently advanced northeast of Hulyaipole near Olhivske, southeast of Hulyaipole near Stepanivka, south of Hulyaipole near Dorozhnyanka, and southwest of Hulyaipole near Zahirne.[51]

Russian forces recently advanced north of Robotyne amid continued offensive operations in the Zaporizhia direction on February 1. The Ukrainian General Staff published a map on February 1 indicating that Russian forces recently advanced south of Mala Tokmachka (north of Robotyne).[52] Russian forces attacked north of Robotyne near Novodanylivka and northwest of Robotyne near Shcherbaky and Nesteryanka on January 31 and February 1.[53] Drone operators of the Russian 136th Motorized Rifle Brigade (58th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) reportedly continue to strike Ukrainian positions in the Zaporizhia direction.[54]

Russian forces continued limited offensive operations in the Dnipro direction on January 31 and February 1 but did not advance.

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

See topline text.

Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)

Nothing significant to report.

Russian Technological Adaptations (Russian objective: Introduce technological innovations to optimize systems for use in Ukraine)

Russian milbloggers continue to complain about problems with Russian armored vehicles. A Russian milblogger complained on February 1 that the Russian military is struggling to transport infantry in frontline areas on armored vehicles and that Russian forces are suffering high losses during transport — likely due to Ukrainian drone strikes.[55] The milblogger criticized the Russian MoD’s unwillingness in previous decades to innovate armored vehicles and called for Russia to develop an analog to the US M113 armored personnel carrier.[56]

Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian citizens into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)

ISW is not publishing coverage of activities in Russian-occupied areas today.

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)

Nothing significant to report.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

[1] https://t.me/kpszsu/27940

[2] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/special-report-russian-strikes-more-effective-ukraine-exhausts-defenses; https://t.me/kpszsu/27940

[3] https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/13145; https://t.me/kpszsu/27940; https://t.me/synegubov/12894; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/02/01/masovana-ataka-na-harkivshhynu-ye-zagybli-poraneni-ta-zrujnovani-budynky/ ; https://t.me/synegubov/12888; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/02/01/vorozhi-udary-po-harkovu-ye-zagybli-ta-poraneni/ ; https://t.me/Mykola_Kalashnyk/4410; https://t.me/mvs_ukraine/46419; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/02/01/rosiya-vdaryla-raketoyu-po-zhytlovomu-budynku-v-poltavi-ye-zagybli-ta-poraneni/; https://t.me/poltavskaOVA/20636; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/02/01/poltavshhyna-pid-udarom-vorog-atakuvav-energetychnu-infrastrukturu-ta-zhytlovyj-budynok/; https://t.me/Klymenko_MVS/1305; https://t.me/odeskaODA/8426; https://t.me/truonline/4218; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/01/31/okupanty-vdaru-balistykoyu-po-istorychnomu-czentru-odesy-ye-postrazhdali-sered-czyvilnyh/ ; https://t.me/truonline/4218; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/01/31/okupanty-vdaru-balistykoyu-po-istorychnomu-czentru-odesy-ye-postrazhdali-sered-czyvilnyh/

[4] https://www.pravda dot com.ua/eng/news/2025/02/1/7496315/

[5] https://t.me/mod_russia/48445

[6] https://t.me/mod_russia/48439 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/48452

[7] https://t.me/inners_of_the_politics/316 ; https://t.me/rybar/67658

[8] https://t.me/milinfolive/141049

[9] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-31-2024

[10] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/23217; https://t.me/z_arhiv/30787; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/23238; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/23238

[11] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/02/01/byj-svoyih-na-kurshhyni-vorog-kabamy-znosyt-vlasni-naseleni-punkty/; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WY8sDvZdWEA

[12] https://t.me/mod_russia/48444; https://t.me/tass_agency/298620; https://t.me/tass_agency/298637; https://t.me/rusich_army/20507

[13] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0nPakX64uMQhDYRjWDMjP2wkB8BtkRt3umJzc2jvFBWoaZy3mumkoQeP6G1g3xgnl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02ybV7ZLeXS9BfBz9QBLhwuoWBCZ1gVzLPYq55erM5kG9EdfZDN3bhcRsC23EYJL3cl; https://t.me/otukharkiv/4034

[14] https://www.facebook.com/photo/?fbid=968230592156686&set=pcb.968230625490016

[15] https://www.facebook.com/photo/?fbid=968230592156686&set=pcb.968230625490016

[16] https://t.me/tass_agency/298624

[17] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02PzjvEAoBSsEypVaa4MLUXadi6LFxXa8iraRpxb23Q2j6tge9WWcNvm4LXMrmNxMZl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0nPakX64uMQhDYRjWDMjP2wkB8BtkRt3umJzc2jvFBWoaZy3mumkoQeP6G1g3xgnl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02ybV7ZLeXS9BfBz9QBLhwuoWBCZ1gVzLPYq55erM5kG9EdfZDN3bhcRsC23EYJL3cl

[18] https://t.me/motopatriot78/31796

[19] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/02/01/spochatku-myaso-potim-profi-desantnyky-rozpovily-pro-vorozhi-shturmy-na-kupyanskomu-napryamku/ ; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=o4XONrDJWsc

[20] https://t.me/rybar/67640

[21] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2523

[22] https://t.me/z_arhiv/30803

[23] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02PzjvEAoBSsEypVaa4MLUXadi6LFxXa8iraRpxb23Q2j6tge9WWcNvm4LXMrmNxMZl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0nPakX64uMQhDYRjWDMjP2wkB8BtkRt3umJzc2jvFBWoaZy3mumkoQeP6G1g3xgnl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02ybV7ZLeXS9BfBz9QBLhwuoWBCZ1gVzLPYq55erM5kG9EdfZDN3bhcRsC23EYJL3cl

[24] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2523

[25] https://t.me/yurasumy/20850; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-20-2025

[26] https://t.me/z_arhiv/30803

[27] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02PzjvEAoBSsEypVaa4MLUXadi6LFxXa8iraRpxb23Q2j6tge9WWcNvm4LXMrmNxMZl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0nPakX64uMQhDYRjWDMjP2wkB8BtkRt3umJzc2jvFBWoaZy3mumkoQeP6G1g3xgnl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02ybV7ZLeXS9BfBz9QBLhwuoWBCZ1gVzLPYq55erM5kG9EdfZDN3bhcRsC23EYJL3cl

[28] https://t.me/voin_dv/13131

[29] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02PzjvEAoBSsEypVaa4MLUXadi6LFxXa8iraRpxb23Q2j6tge9WWcNvm4LXMrmNxMZl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0nPakX64uMQhDYRjWDMjP2wkB8BtkRt3umJzc2jvFBWoaZy3mumkoQeP6G1g3xgnl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02ybV7ZLeXS9BfBz9QBLhwuoWBCZ1gVzLPYq55erM5kG9EdfZDN3bhcRsC23EYJL3cl; https://t.me/luhanskaVTSA/24340

[30] https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/4752

[31] https://t.me/wargonzo/24587

[32] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=o4XONrDJWsc; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/02/01/ye-kym-udobryuvaty-chornozem-u-rajoni-vidpovidalnosti-otu-lugansk-u-voroga-poky-ye-syly-dlya-nastupu/

[33] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/8268; https://t.me/ptashkaDoDo/1492

[34] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02PzjvEAoBSsEypVaa4MLUXadi6LFxXa8iraRpxb23Q2j6tge9WWcNvm4LXMrmNxMZl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0nPakX64uMQhDYRjWDMjP2wkB8BtkRt3umJzc2jvFBWoaZy3mumkoQeP6G1g3xgnl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02ybV7ZLeXS9BfBz9QBLhwuoWBCZ1gVzLPYq55erM5kG9EdfZDN3bhcRsC23EYJL3cl; https://t.me/rybar/67654

[35] https://t.me/dva_majors/63549

[36] https://t.me/dva_majors/63549; https://t.me/dva_majors/63560; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/23229 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/298621; https://t.me/tass_agency/298632

[37] https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/1885727906162233798; https://geoconfirmed.org/ukraine/660031ba-9bfa-4b48-ca60-08dd3bdfeee4; https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/1885263785922806266; https://t.me/ombr_28/1745

[38] https://t.me/mod_russia/48445 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/48448 ; https://t.me/ghost_of_novorossia/22402

[39] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02PzjvEAoBSsEypVaa4MLUXadi6LFxXa8iraRpxb23Q2j6tge9WWcNvm4LXMrmNxMZl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0nPakX64uMQhDYRjWDMjP2wkB8BtkRt3umJzc2jvFBWoaZy3mumkoQeP6G1g3xgnl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02ybV7ZLeXS9BfBz9QBLhwuoWBCZ1gVzLPYq55erM5kG9EdfZDN3bhcRsC23EYJL3cl; https://t.me/rybar/67656

[40] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=o4XONrDJWsc; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/02/01/bez-motyvacziyi-na-toreczkomu-napryamku-pozycziyi-zsu-shturmuyut-meshkanczi-donechchyny-ta-luganshhyny-yakyh-mobilizuvala-armiya-rf/

[41] https://x.com/richardzai38580/status/1885392019071394149; https://t.me/skarlatop/4450 ; https://x.com/MikiValuena/status/1885394428585501161; https://x.com/PuenteUribarri/status/1885320580569661653; https://t.me/Wormbusters/44

[42] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02PzjvEAoBSsEypVaa4MLUXadi6LFxXa8iraRpxb23Q2j6tge9WWcNvm4LXMrmNxMZl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0nPakX64uMQhDYRjWDMjP2wkB8BtkRt3umJzc2jvFBWoaZy3mumkoQeP6G1g3xgnl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02ybV7ZLeXS9BfBz9QBLhwuoWBCZ1gVzLPYq55erM5kG9EdfZDN3bhcRsC23EYJL3cl ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/4752 ; https://t.me/yurasumy/20857 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/24578

[43] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2524

[44] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/8267; https://t.me/DeepStateUA/21188

[45] ttps://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02PzjvEAoBSsEypVaa4MLUXadi6LFxXa8iraRpxb23Q2j6tge9WWcNvm4LXMrmNxMZl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0nPakX64uMQhDYRjWDMjP2wkB8BtkRt3umJzc2jvFBWoaZy3mumkoQeP6G1g3xgnl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02ybV7ZLeXS9BfBz9QBLhwuoWBCZ1gVzLPYq55erM5kG9EdfZDN3bhcRsC23EYJL3cl ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/61821 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/23222 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/24578 ; https://t.me/z_arhiv/30791

[46] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2524

[47] https://www.facebook.com/photo/?fbid=968230592156686&set=pcb.968230625490016

[48] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02PzjvEAoBSsEypVaa4MLUXadi6LFxXa8iraRpxb23Q2j6tge9WWcNvm4LXMrmNxMZl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0nPakX64uMQhDYRjWDMjP2wkB8BtkRt3umJzc2jvFBWoaZy3mumkoQeP6G1g3xgnl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02ybV7ZLeXS9BfBz9QBLhwuoWBCZ1gVzLPYq55erM5kG9EdfZDN3bhcRsC23EYJL3cl

[49] https://t.me/okspn/35273 ; https://x.com/666_mancer/status/1885580019264553012 ; https://t.me/NeoficialniyBeZsonoV/43377 ; https://t.me/rsotmdivision/25412

[50] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2525

[51] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0nPakX64uMQhDYRjWDMjP2wkB8BtkRt3umJzc2jvFBWoaZy3mumkoQeP6G1g3xgnl

[52] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0nPakX64uMQhDYRjWDMjP2wkB8BtkRt3umJzc2jvFBWoaZy3mumkoQeP6G1g3xgnl

[53] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02PzjvEAoBSsEypVaa4MLUXadi6LFxXa8iraRpxb23Q2j6tge9WWcNvm4LXMrmNxMZl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0nPakX64uMQhDYRjWDMjP2wkB8BtkRt3umJzc2jvFBWoaZy3mumkoQeP6G1g3xgnl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02ybV7ZLeXS9BfBz9QBLhwuoWBCZ1gVzLPYq55erM5kG9EdfZDN3bhcRsC23EYJL3cl

[54] https://t.me/voin_dv/13132

[55] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/61833

[56] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/61834