The militarization of Greenland and the wider Arctic region may push Russia and China closer together.
The Russia-U.S. relationship (or lack thereof) has long dominated Arctic geopolitics. Geography makes the two neighbors and stakeholders sharing the challenges of a warming region. President Trump’s enduring interest in acquiring Greenland injects further potential geostrategic challenges in the region’s icy arena. When the idea was floated during his initial term in office, the immediate response from Russian leadership, state-operated media, and the public was a flood of memes.
The second time around, however, Russia’s domestic discourse has a more strategic flavor. Discussions now appear to focus less on the “novelty” of such an acquisition and more on understanding the “objectives.” Three potential scenarios for U.S.-Greenland relations are being debated in Moscow in terms of the strategic implications for Russia.
The primary scenario is the maintenance of the status quo. Maintaining the status quo would undoubtedly work in Russia’s favor, as it would allow Moscow to maintain its position as the major military stakeholder in the Arctic. Moscow is wary, however, of the Danish Government’s potential to respond to Trump’s rhetoric by deepening ties with China. The Russia-China relationship is complex, integrated, and fueled by the regional ambitions of both players. Greenland has long provided a potential platform for increased Chinese presence in the Arctic, which pushes both Moscow and Beijing to deepen cooperation.
Of course, Denmark (and Greenland) has a successful track record of pushing back on China’s economic encroachment. Attempted investments in Greenlandic airports and key sovereign infrastructure have been thwarted. However, Russian discourse appears concerned over the current state of confusion and uncertainty in European politics. This may yet provide fertile ground for China’s agile foreign policy with Russia’s encouragement to take root in the High North.
A second scenario discussed in Russia is the incremental expansion of the U.S. presence in Greenland. This poses significant challenges for Russia. These challenges can be categorized into three primary areas: the strengthening of U.S. military presence in the Arctic, control over strategic sea lines of communication in the High North, and control over rare earth mineral deposits.
An expansion of Greenland’s Pittufik military base, formerly known as Tula, or the modernization of its infrastructure to accommodate missile defense systems or advanced radar technology would enhance U.S. capacity for monitoring the GIUK gap. This is a strategic entry point into the North Atlantic for Russia’s maritime fleet. Additionally, the deployment of large-scale non-nuclear missile systems would likely be perceived as a direct threat to Russia’s interests (which are not limited to state survival) in the Russian Arctic region.
Linked to this is the strategic narrative in Moscow, which fears the return of a Cuban Missile Crisis—only this time, in the Arctic. An inevitable pursuit of parity in both defensive and offensive capabilities will lead to further militarization of the Arctic. Moscow would likely reinforce its Arctic brigades and deploy hypersonic missiles on proximate Russian islands in the Arctic Ocean.
There is already a precedent of Moscow engaging in retaliatory measures in the Arctic. Immediately after the 2021 U.S.-Norway Agreement on expanding military cooperation in the Arctic was signed, Russia conducted a large-scale (scientific) expedition called Umka-2021. This expedition was organized by the Russian Navy in collaboration with the Russian Geographical Society. However, it had a distinct military flavor.
A third scenario being discussed is the United States “taking” Greenland through military force. The prospect of Washington establishing military control over Greenland is largely shrugged off but not altogether absent from Russian strategic discourse. This would be a stark departure from recent U.S. policy. The United States is leading key collaborative efforts in the Arctic, notably supporting allies to “consolidate” all potential fissures in Arctic-nation bilateral relations. The recent settlement of the longstanding territorial dispute between Canada and Denmark regarding Hans Island is another example of U.S. policy to foster a collaborative Arctic climate.
Russia’s strategic Arctic objectives remain rather fixed: maintaining military dominance, securing sovereign control over the Northern Sea Route (NSR), and protecting vital access to and control of Arctic mineral resources. All three of the potential scenarios ruminating in Moscow when it comes to Trump’s Greenland play pose at least some threat to Russia’s Arctic objectives. A point of commonality is that any future U.S. designs for Greenland (from an uptick in diplomatic ties to outright annexation) will serve as an impetus for the (re)militarization of the Arctic.
Trump 2.0 will almost certainly usher in a shift of strategic tempo in the Arctic. The notion of annexation by force might be unlikely, but the potential outcomes for Moscow are severe, if not fundamental, challenges to Russia’s strategic calculus in the Arctic. Primarily, Moscow is concerned about the United States using Greenland to counter Russia’s claims to sovereignty over the NSR more effectively. The NSR is a strategic game-changer for Asia-Europe shipping and reorients global transportation with profound implications. Moscow is likely to find itself in a controlling position over global trade routes. At least for the looming Asian Century.
Perhaps more concerning for the long-term global strategic balance is just how far the U.S. Greenland policy will push Moscow and Beijing, and eventually New Delhi, to work together in the Arctic. All three scenarios discussed in Russia lead to the expansion and deepening (to various extents) of Russia-China Arctic relations. U.S. Greenland policy, whatever comes out in the wash, will likely spark a renewed round of cooperation between Moscow and Beijing.
Pushing China and Russia closer to the Arctic is an outcome that does not correlate with Russia’s preferred position of full Arctic sovereignty. However, this might yet be framed as a necessary process on the pathway to building a multipolar world. It would seem the Arctic is set to be the first real test of this new world revered both in Moscow and Beijing. And this is the long-term strategic problem facing Washington in the Arctic.
Elizabeth Buchanan is a Visiting Fellow at the Center for the National Interest.
Anton Sokolov is a member of the Expert Board of the Russian Gas Society.
Image: Mika Migla / Shutterstock.com.
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