How to prevent the next war in Europe: A five-point plan

Great-power thinking, disdain for alliances, and a bitter culture war—these three terms describe the new relationship between Europe and the United States following recent developments at the Munich Security Conference.

Although much remains to be seen, the general direction is clear: the US is stepping back from its leading political and military role.

Washington has initiated negotiations with Russia over the heads of Ukraine and other Europeans—presenting everyone with a fait accompli. The US is right to call on Europeans to contribute more to defence and has announced a rebalancing of its own policy towards Asia.

While the substance of these pronouncements was hardly surprising, their scope and sharpness were. The US has not (yet), as feared, announced it will withdraw its troops from Europe. But its actions and behaviour do not appear to be those of an ally. Europe must now try to shape this transatlantic rift itself.

With recent developments, the risk of another war in Europe has increased. In the logic of great-power politics, President Donald Trump immediately offered Russian president Vladimir Putin negotiations—without prior involvement of Ukraine—as if it were no longer a sovereign state.

Even before negotiations have begun, Trump has met key Russian demands: Ukraine’s renunciation of NATO membership, de facto recognition of Russia’s annexations, and the US no longer treating Moscow as a pariah but as a great power on an equal footing. For Ukraine, Washington is no longer an ally but an intermediary, if not an adversary. The message to Russia is: a war of aggression is worth it if you hold out long enough. The message to the Europeans is: you don’t count, you’re not involved in negotiations about your security. It’s a humiliation.

Such a “peace on Russia’s terms” would be dangerous for all of Europe. The majority of the Ukrainian population continues to refuse to accept Russian terms. However, ceasefire agreements have the greatest chance of success if they are supported, actually implemented and violations sanctioned.

If the Ukrainian government was forced to sign an agreement against the will of the majority of its population, it would likely not survive politically. Agreements that lack popular support and reliable protection for what remains of free Ukraine risk ending in domestic chaos and might strengthen Russia’s influence over the “rest of Ukraine.”

The end of a sovereign Ukraine looms

Without a secure framework, there will be no reconstruction or investment, and without security and prosperity, democratic processes are at risk of being undermined. A demographic and financial exodus would be likely. Weakened in this way, Ukraine would become an easier target for another Russian attack. In fact, Russia could continue its war under better conditions. This could spell the end of a sovereign Ukraine, another war in Europe, and a further confirmation for Moscow and others that war pays off.

Right now, Russia even has more options: it can merely pretend to engage in negotiations, drag them out, and further wear down Ukraine by continuing to fight in parallel. This could also divide European societies. Support for Ukraine might wane if such tactical negotiations give the false impression of a tangible end to the war—one that supposedly should not be jeopardised by arms deliveries.

The second danger arises from an inadequate safeguarding of the war’s end. As long as Russia holds onto its objectives—namely, destroying an independent Ukrainian identity and dividing Europe into spheres of influence—and as long as it has the means (from tanks to troops) to pursue these goals militarily, Ukraine and the rest of Europe remain threatened.

US secretary of defence Pete Hegseth has made it clear there will be no NATO membership and no US troops to secure Ukraine, nor any NATO troops; Europeans alone will be responsible. Depending on which security model Europeans would apply, an additional 100,000 to 150,000 Western troops might be required—alongside strong Ukrainian forces—to secure a ceasefire and deter Russia. That entails everything from surveillance and equipment to air and missile defence, along with rotating forces.

However, Europeans lack sufficient numbers, key capabilities, and the political will to take on this task without US support. Many Europeans are reluctant to compromise their own defence to protect Ukraine (for instance, if they had to reduce forces along NATO’s eastern flank in order to deploy them in Ukraine). At the same time, inadequate Western security guarantees might tempt Russia to put them to the test, to conquer Ukraine after all—and start yet another war in Europe.

If Europeans want to prevent the next war in Europe and ensure they have a seat at the table when Russia and the US negotiate Europe’s future, they must quickly present a plan that impresses both Moscow and Washington. Instead of invoking the next “European moment” or issuing further “wake-up calls,” they must immediately adopt an action program with a clear timetable. The goal is to strengthen Ukraine, improve Europe’s own defensive capabilities, and increase deterrence against Russia. It should encompass five points:

1. Strengthen Ukraine so that it can defend itself as effectively as possible in the current dire situation and repel proposals that are unacceptable for Ukraine. Although Europeans cannot fully compensate for the US role, they still have considerable leverage: They could impose additional sanctions, fully utilise Russia’s frozen assets, provide €40bn in support for Ukraine this year, and invest 0.25% of their GDP in Ukraine going forward. Politically, Europeans should jointly affirm the goal of an independent Ukraine that has sovereign control over how the war ends.
2. Define the basic outlines of a ceasefire. This includes determining the location of a ceasefire line, a demilitarised zone, and possible regional force limitations—all of which affect the scale and risk of Europe’s own contributions to security. With a convincing European military package, Europeans could make a more credible request to the US for critical contributions such as intelligence. At the same time, Europeans must prepare for more extensive Russian demands regarding Europe’s security order and clarify what is non-negotiable. Proposals to limit the number of long-range weapons systems, or conventional and nuclear NATO exercises, or to curtail NATO’s deterrent development must be confronted. They also need an overall plan that secures Ukraine, addresses the status of the Russian-occupied territories, and includes aspects like reparations and prisoner exchanges.
3. Convert this transatlantic turning point into tangible defensive capabilities. A commitment to spending 3% or more of GDP on defence would send a strong signal to Russia, the US, and European publics that defence is a priority. For Germany, that means ensuring a long-term, reliable, and sufficient defence budget and clearly identifying the sources of financing. At the European level, the European Commission could support national efforts through an exception clause (as during the pandemic) that allows member states to deviate from debt and deficit limits. Further financing mechanisms involving non-EU states like Britain and Turkey should also be prepared.
4. A transformation plan for Europe’s defence. Europeans must try to negotiate with the US to establish a timetable for taking on Europe’s conventional defence themselves and thus allow for the gradual withdrawal of US troops without incurring major risks. A particular challenge will be the nuclear dimension of deterrence, which in Europe is guaranteed predominantly by the US.
5. All this can only be convincingly decided if it is clear how the Europeans will fill the leadership role previously occupied by the US. European nations, the EU, and NATO therefore need a stable agreement on who is legitimately and permanently in charge of which areas—and thus decides on objectives and the use of military force.

Time is running out; the situation is dangerous. It is no longer enough to rely on resolute-sounding platitudes. Europe and Ukraine stand on the brink.

This article is an adapted version of an original piece first published in German on Spiegel Online on February 18th 2025