Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, February 26, 2025

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, February 26, 2025

Davit Gasparyan, Grace Mappes, Nicole Wolkov, Christina Harward, Karolina Hird, and Frederick W. Kagan

February 26, 2025, 7pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of Ukraine’s offensive in Kursk Oblast.

Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 12pm ET on February 26. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the February 27 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

US President Donald Trump and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky are planning to meet at the White House on February 28, likely to sign a US-Ukraine mineral deal. A draft agreement of the deal published ahead of the meeting does not provide US security assistance or security guarantees to Ukraine, however.[1] The Financial Times (FT) published a draft bilateral US-Ukrainian deal on February 26 that states that the United States wants to “invest alongside Ukraine in a free, sovereign and secure Ukraine” and supports “Ukraine’s efforts to obtain security guarantees needed to establish lasting peace” but does not include any concrete US provisions of security assistance or guarantees to Ukraine.[2] Continued US security assistance to Ukraine is essential to help Ukraine set conditions for a lasting and just resolution of the war that is in the interests of Ukraine, the United States, and Europe.

Russian officials directly involved in negotiations with the United States continue to insist that any peace agreement to resolve the war in Ukraine must be based on Russia’s 2021 demands. They also insist on the surrender to Russia of territory that Ukrainian forces currently hold that is home to major cities and well over a million people. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, who recently led the Russian delegation at the February 18 US-Russian negotiations in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, claimed on February 26 that negotiations that result in freezing the current frontlines in Ukraine are impossible because the Russian Constitution stipulates that Russia’s borders include all of Ukraine’s Donetsk, Luhansk, Kherson, and Zaporizhia oblasts.[3] Russia currently does not occupy large parts of Donetsk, Kherson, and Zaporizhia oblasts and a small part of western Luhansk Oblast. Lavrov also stated that Russia will reject any peace deal that involves continued Western arms provisions to Ukraine.[4] Lavrov is repackaging the maximalist demands Russia has long made of Ukraine using a pseudo-legal facade, despite the illegitimacy of Russian annexations of Ukrainian territory under international law.[5] Lavrov likely attempted to justify Russia’s long-standing demands by framing the Russian Constitution as a legal and hence “necessary” element in future negotiations with the United States. Russian officials have previously invoked “denazification,” the alleged Ukrainian violations of Russian-speaking minorities’ rights, and the false historical narrative that Ukraine is inherently part of Russia to justify their territorial claims against Ukraine and to call for full Ukrainian capitulation.[6]

Russia is demanding that Ukraine surrender several large cities that Russian forces do not currently occupy and have no prospect of seizing, handing over one million Ukrainians to Russia. Russia’s occupation of the remainder of the four Ukrainian oblasts would include large cities such as Kherson City (pre-war population of about 275,000), Kramatorsk (147,00 people), and Zaporizhzhia City (706,000 people) — all of which remain under Ukrainian control. The Russian occupation of such large population centers would significantly escalate the humanitarian catastrophe in Ukraine. Russian authorities would likely employ the same tactics of oppression, displacement, and forcible assimilation against Ukrainian civilians living in these areas as they have employed against the millions of Ukrainians who have been living under Russian occupation for over three years.[7] Russian advances have recently stalled along the frontline, and Russian forces increasingly face unsustainable vehicle and personnel losses, indicating that Russian forces will likely be unable to occupy the full extent of these oblasts through military means in any short period of time if at all.[8] Lavrov’s rhetoric is likely an attempt to achieve through negotiations what the Russian military cannot achieve by force. The Kremlin’s stated intent of seizing more of Ukraine’s land and people directly contradicts US and European efforts to achieve a sustainable and lasting peace in Ukraine and reinforces Russia’s continued efforts to illegally occupy Ukrainian territory rather than to negotiate in good faith or offer concessions.

Lavrov’s and other Kremlin officials’ continued rejections of a ceasefire and other terms that US President Donald Trump and European leaders have identified as necessary to achieve a lasting peace in Ukraine demonstrate that Russian President Vladimir Putin remains uninterested in meaningful negotiations and assesses that he can achieve his war objectives militarily in the medium- to long-term. Putin and other Kremlin officials continuously call back to Putin’s pre-war demands and insist that negotiations must address the “root causes” of the war, which amount to Ukraine’s full capitulation and Russia’s aims to weaken NATO.[9] US Congressional and Western intelligence officials recently assessed that Putin retains these war aims and is uninterested in negotiations.[10] Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky has consistently reiterated Ukraine’s intent to negotiate with Russia in good faith and make compromises, including offering a territorial exchange that Russian officials rejected, and negotiating directly with Putin despite Putin’s continuous efforts to discredit Zelensky.[11] US officials have also offered negotiating terms to Russia to promote good-faith negotiations.[12] The Kremlin is attempting to portray the US and European positions on negotiations as significantly different by falsely portraying European countries as wanting to continue the war when the United States and European countries largely agree on key points.[13] US and European officials have continuously reiterated that both Russia and Ukraine will have to make territorial concessions, and Trump reiterated again on February 26 that Russia will have to make concessions in peace negotiations.[14]

European countries have announced several new military assistance packages for Ukraine in recent weeks and reiterated the importance of continued military assistance to Ukraine.[15] US Secretary of State Marco Rubio stated on February 26 that “what Ukraine really needs is a deterrent…to make it costly for anyone to come after them again in the future.”[16] US and European officials have also continuously reiterated the importance of preserving Ukrainian sovereignty and the importance of both Ukrainian and European involvement in peace negotiations.[17] The Kremlin likely aims to exacerbate divisions between the United States and Europe as well as between the US, Europe, and Ukraine to extract further concessions in peace negotiations and other talks in Russia’s favor, including those that support Putin’s maximalist war aims.

Key Takeaways:

• US President Donald Trump and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky are planning to meet at the White House on February 28, likely to sign a US-Ukraine mineral deal. A draft agreement of the deal published ahead of the meeting does not provide US security assistance or security guarantees to Ukraine, however.
• Russian officials directly involved in negotiations with the United States continue to insist that any peace agreement to resolve the war in Ukraine must be based on Russia’s 2021 demands. They also insist on the surrender to Russia of territory that Ukrainian forces currently hold that is home to major cities and well over a million people.
• Russia is demanding that Ukraine surrender several large cities that Russian forces do not currently occupy and have no prospect of seizing, handing over one million Ukrainians to Russia.
• Lavrov’s and other Kremlin officials’ continued rejections of a ceasefire and other terms that US President Donald Trump and European leaders have identified as necessary to achieve a lasting peace in Ukraine demonstrate that Russian President Vladimir Putin remains uninterested in meaningful negotiations and assesses that he can achieve his war objectives militarily in the medium- to long-term.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Toretsk and Pokrovsk, and Russian forces recently advanced near Kupyansk, Chasiv Yar, Kurakhove, Velyka Novosilka, and Robotyne.
• Russian officials proposed that the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) assume control over all Russian pretrial detention facilities amid reports that the FSB is in charge of a pretrial detention facility linked to the abuse of Ukrainian prisoners of war (POWs).

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports. 

• Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
• Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
• Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
• Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
• Russian Technological Adaptations
• Activities in Russian-occupied areas
• Significant Activity in Belarus

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

Russian forces continued attacking in Kursk Oblast on February 26 but did not make any confirmed advances. Fighting continued northwest of Sudzha near Pogrebki, Orlovka, Novaya Sorochina, and Lebedevka; south of Sudzha near Guyevo and Kurilovka; and southeast of Sudzha near Makhnovka.[18]

Unconfirmed Russian-claimed advances: The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that elements of the Russian 9th Motorized Rifle Regiment (18th Motorized Rifle Division, 11th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) and 34th Motorized Rifle Brigade (49th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) seized Pogrebki and that unspecified Russian forces seized Orlovka.[19] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces also seized Lebedevka and Kurilovka and advanced near Sverdlikovo (northwest of Sudzha), Novaya Sorochina, and Cherkasskaya Konopelka (southeast of Sudzha).[20] The Russian MoD and other Russian sources claimed that Russian forces have established fire control over the H-07/P200 Yunakivka-Sudzha highway using drones.[21]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 30th Motorized Rifle Regiment (72nd Motorized Rifle Division, 44th AC, LMD) are reportedly operating near Sudzha.[22] Elements of the Russian 22nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (72nd Motorized Rifle Division, 44th AC, LMD) are reportedly operating near Novaya Sorochina.[23]

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kharkiv direction on February 26 but did not advance. Russian forces conducted offensive operations northeast of Kharkiv City near Vovchansk on February 25 and 26.[24]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces recently advanced in the Kupyansk direction. Russian forces conducted offensive operations north of Kupyansk near Dvorichna, Radkivka, and Kindrashivka and east of Kupyansk near Petropavlivka on February 25 and 26.[25] A Russian milblogger claimed on February 26 that Ukrainian forces counterattacked between Dvoricha and Zapadne (north of Kupyansk).[26]

Assessed Russian Advances: The Ukrainian General Staff published a map on February 26 indicating that Russian forces recently advanced along Soniachna Street in northern Dvorichna.[27]

Unconfirmed Russian-claimed advances: A Russian milblogger claimed on February 25 that Russian forces advanced north of Novomlynsk and west of Kalynove (both northeast of Kupyansk).[28] Another Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced towards Kindrashivka and seized most of Holubivka (north of Kupyansk).[29]

A Ukrainian brigade operating in the Kupyansk direction published footage on February 26 showing elements of the brigade conducting a drone strike against a Russian ammunition depot in the Kupyansk direction.[30]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Borova direction on February 26 but did not advance. Russian forces conducted offensive operations northeast of Borova near Zahryzove and east of Borova near Nadiya and Kopanky on February 25 and 26.[31]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Lyman direction on February 26 but did not advance. Russian forces attacked north of Lyman toward Zelena Dolyna and northeast of Lyman near Novolyubivka, Yampolivka, Torske, and Kolodyazi on February 25 and 26.[32]

The commander of a Ukrainian company operating in the Lyman direction reported on February 26 that Russian forces are advancing in small infantry groups and that Russian forces rarely use vehicles due to  forested terrain.[33] A Ukrainian regiment operating in Luhansk Oblast published footage on February 25 of elements of the regiment destroying a Russian Strela-10M4 anti-aircraft missile system in the Luhansk direction.[34]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Chechen Akhmat Spetsnaz “Shram” Group are reportedly operating in the Lyman direction.[35]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Siversk direction on February 26 but did not advance. Russian forces continued attacking northeast of Siversk near Bilohorivka; east of Siversk near Verkhnokamyanske; and southeast of Siversk near Ivano-Darivka on February 25 and 26.[36]

Order of Battle: Element of the Russian 1102nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (3rd Combined Arms Army [CAA], formerly 2nd Luhansk Peoples Republic Army Corps [LNR AC], Southern Military District [SMD]) reportedly continue operating near Bilohorivka.[37]

Russian forces recently advanced in the Chasiv Yar direction. Russian forces attacked near and within Chasiv Yar and south of Chasiv Yar toward Stupochky on February 25 and 26.[38]

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on February 26 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced along Horkoho Street in western Chasiv Yar.[39]

Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Toretsk direction. Russian forces attacked near Toretsk and north of Toretsk near Krymske on February 25 and 26.[40]

Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on February 26 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced along Chaikovoskoho and Karla Libknekhta streets in northern Toretsk.[41]

Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Pokrovsk direction. Russian forces conducted offensive operations northeast of Pokrovsk near Tarasivka and Vodyane Druhe; east of Pokrovsk near Novotoretske, Myrolyubivka, and Promin; southeast of Pokrovsk near Lysivka; south of Pokrovsk near Dachenske; and southwest of Pokrovsk near Zvirove, Leontovychi (formerly Pershe Travyna), Kotlyne, Udachne, Nadiivka, Uspenivka, Pishchane, Preobrazhenka, and Novooleksandrivka on February 25 and 26.[42] A Russian source claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Novooleksandrivka, Kotlyne, Pishchane, and Udachne.[43]

Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on February 26 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced north of Pishchane.[44]

Unconfirmed Russian-claimed advances: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces seized Zaporizhzhia (southwest of Pokrovsk) and advanced south of Zaporizhzhia, northeast of Pishchane, and near Kotlyne.[45] A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger claimed that reports that Russian forces seized Pishchane are inaccurate.[46]

A Ukrainian brigade operating in the Pokrovsk direction stated on February 26 that Ukrainian forces seized Kotlyne.[47] Russian milbloggers continued to claim that Ukrainian forces advanced in central Uspenivka but have not pushed Russian forces entirely out of the settlement.[48] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces are suffering from “acute” personnel shortages in the Pokrovsk and Kurakhove directions.[49]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 506th Motorized Rifle Regiment (27th Motorized Rifle Division, 2nd CAA, Central Military District [CMD]) are reportedly operating near Uspenivka; elements of the 228th and 428th motorized rifle regiments (both of the 90th Tank Division, 41st CAA, CMD) are reportedly operating near Zaporizhzhia; elements of the “Vizantiya” detachment are reportedly operating in the Pokrovsk direction.[50]

Russian forces recently advanced in the Kurakhove direction. Russian forces conducted offensive operations west of Kurakhove near Andriivka, Kostyantynopil, and Bahatyr and southwest of Kurakhove near Rozdolne and Rozlyv on February 25 and 26.[51]

Assessed Russian advances: The Ukrainian General Staff published a map on February 26 indicating that Russian forces recently advanced to the T-0515 Pokrovsk-Andriivka highway northeast of Andriivka.[52] Geolocated footage published on February 25 shows Ukrainian forces striking a Russian-occupied building in western Andriivka, indicating that Russian forces recently seized the settlement.[53]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 242nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (20th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA, SMD) are reportedly operating in the Kurakhove direction; and elements of the 36th Motorized Rifle Brigade (29th CAA, EMD) are reportedly operating near Kostyantynopil.[54]

Russian forces recently advanced near Velyka Novosilka. Russian forces conducted offensive operations north of Velyka Novosilka near Novoocheretuvate, Skudne, and Dniproenerhiya and northwest of Velyka Novosilka near Burlatske on February 25 and 26.[55]

Assessed Russian advances: The Ukrainian General Staff published a map on February 26 indicating that Russian forces advanced south of Novosilka (west of Velyka Novosilka).[56]

Unconfirmed Russian-claimed advances: Russian sources claimed that Russian forces seized Skudne and advanced south of Burlatske and northeast of Novosilka.[57]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)

Russian forces recently advanced in western Zaporizhia Oblast. Russian forces conducted offensive operations northeast of Robotyne toward Charivne and northwest of Robotyne near Pyatykhatky, Mali Shcherbaky, and Kamyanske and toward Novoandriivka on February 25 and 26.[58]

Assessed Russian advances: The Ukrainian General Staff published a map on February 26 indicating that Russian forces recently advanced south of Shcherbaky and northeast of Luhove (both northwest of Robotyne).[59]

Unconfirmed Russian-claimed advances: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces seized Pyatykhatky and advanced toward Lobkove (northwest of Pyatykhatky) and south of Stepove (northeast of Pyatykhatky).[60]

Ukraine’s Southern Operational Command reported on February 26 that Ukrainian forces destroyed a Russian Buk-M3 air defense system in southern Ukraine.[61]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 100th Reconnaissance Brigade (58th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly operating near Kamyanske.[62]

Russian forces continued limited ground attacks in the Dnipro direction on February 25 and 26 but did not advance.[63]

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

Russian forces conducted a series of drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of February 25 and 26. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 177 Shahed and decoy drones from the directions of Oryol, Bryansk, and Kursk cities; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; Shatalovo, Smolensk Oblast; and Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai.[64] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces shot down 110 drones over Kharkiv, Poltava, Sumy, Chernihiv, Kirovohrad, Mykolaiv, Kherson, and Dnipropetrovsk oblasts and that 66 decoy drones were “lost,” likely due to Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) interference. Ukrainian officials reported that Russian drones struck Kyiv, Kharkiv, Kirovohrad, and Sumy oblasts.[65]

Head of Ukraine’s Center for Combatting Disinformation Lieutenant Andriy Kovalenko stated on February 26 that Russian forces are flying drones at lower altitudes than before in order to test reinforced antennas and counter Ukrainian EW interference.[66]

A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger claimed on February 26 that Russian forces have started to target Ukrainian gas production infrastructure facilities and that Russian forces have struck more than 10 oil and gas facilities in Kharkiv, Poltava, Cherkasy, Chernihiv, Lviv, and Kyiv oblasts since January 1.[67]

Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)

Russian officials proposed that the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) assume control over all Russian pretrial detention facilities amid reports that the FSB is in charge of a pretrial detention facility linked to the abuse of Ukrainian prisoners of war (POWs). Russian State Duma Security and Anti-Corruption Committee Chairperson Vasily Piskarev announced on February 26 that he submitted a bill that would transfer control of Russian pretrial detention facilities from the Russian Federal Penitentiary Service back to the FSB.[68] Piskarev claimed that the number of detentions for treason, extremism, and terrorism have multiplied since the start of the war in Ukraine and that transferring pretrial detention facilities back to the FSB allows for additional security in the facilities and more effective criminal investigations. Actors reportedly affiliated with the Islamic State (IS) took hostages at Russian penal colonies in two high-profile incidences in June and August 2024.[69] The FSB reportedly controls the SIZO-2 pretrial detention center in Taganrog, Rostov Oblast, which is reportedly a torture center for Ukrainian POWs.[70] The FSB is reportedly recruiting former Russian civilian and military officials in pretrial detention centers and colonies for the war effort in Ukraine.[71] Russia transferred control of pretrial detention facilities from the FSB to the Federal Penitentiary Service in April 2006 to comply with membership requirements for the Council of Europe, which expelled Russia in March 2022 in response to Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine.[72]

The Kremlin continues to militarize the Russian government by appointing veterans of the war in Ukraine to government positions. The Russian “Time of Heroes” veteran program, which prepares Russian veterans of the war in Ukraine for professional work outside of the military, announced on February 26 that its participant Alexander Sheptukhin became the Advisor to the Russian Federal Air Transport Agency (Rosaviatsia) head.[73]

Russian Technological Adaptations (Russian objective: Introduce technological innovations to optimize systems for use in Ukraine)

The Russian defense industrial base (DIB) continues efforts to innovate drone and missile technology to use in Ukraine. A Russian weapons designer claimed on February 25 to have developed a neural network to provide targeting and guidance information for strike drones and missiles, which is ready for Russian arms manufacturers to integrate into weapon systems.[74] The designer claimed that the neural networks a unique “homing head” on the missiles and drones to detect enemy drones and that cameras on drones can help detect enemy targets.

Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian citizens into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)

ISW is not publishing coverage of activities in Russian-occupied areas today.

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)

The Russian and Belarusian parliaments voted on February 26 to ratify the Russian-Belarusian security guarantees that Russian President Vladimir Putin and Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko signed on December 6, 2024 as part of the Union State agreements.[75] Russian state media and pro-Kremlin outlets highlighted a provision that allows Russia to establish military facilities and base Russian personnel in Belarus.[76] The Kremlin likely aims for this framing to project strength domestically within Russia and Belarus.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

[1] https://www.president.gov dot ua/news/nashi-komandi-pracyuyut-z-amerikoyu-gotuyemosya-do-peremovin-96389 ; https://www.cbsnews.com/news/ukraine-us-economic-deal-rare-earth-minerals/

[2] https://www.ft.com/content/387afd63-9467-413f-84d0-4f52a3a95a34

[3] https://tass dot ru/politika/23251975 ; https://www.rbc dot ru/politics/26/02/2025/67beecdb9a7947f36fb4155c ; https://mid dot ru/ru/foreign_policy/news/2000130/ 

[4] https://t.me/rian_ru/282648; https://t.me/belta_telegramm/296930

[5] https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2022/09/russia-ukraine-so-called-referenda-in-the-occupied-territories-are-in-blatant-breach-of-international-law/; https://www.cnn.com/2022/09/30/europe/putin-russia-ukraine-annexation-intl/index.html; https://press.un dot org/en/2022/ga12458.doc.htm

[6] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-14-2025; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-25-2025; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-2-2024; http://en.kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/66181; https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/ukrainealert/peace-is-impossible-while-vladimir-putin-denies-ukraines-right-to-exist/

[7] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/kremlins-occupation-playbook-coerced-russification-and-ethnic-cleansing-occupied

[8] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-13-2025; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russia-has-failed-break-ukraine; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-24-2025; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-15-2025

[9] https://isw.pub/UkrWar021825;  https://isw.pub/UkrWar013025; https://isw.pub/UkrWar021225; https://isw.pub/UkrWar012025; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-29-2025

[10] https://isw.pub/UkrWar021825

[11] https://isw.pub/UkrWar022525; https://isw.pub/UkrWar021625; https://isw.pub/UkrWar021425; https://isw.pub/UkrWar020525; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-24-2025 ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-18-2025 ; https://www.theguardian.com/world/2025/feb/11/zelenskyy-europe-cannot-guarantee-ukraines-security-without-america; https://news.sky.com/story/zelenskyy-suggests-hes-prepared-to-end-ukraine-war-in-return-for-nato-membership-even-if-russia-doesnt-immediately-return-seized-land-13263085

[12] https://www.cnn.com/2025/02/17/politics/trump-putin-concessions-ukraine-analysis/index.html; https://www.state.gov/secretary-marco-rubio-with-catherine-herridge/; https://www.state.gov/secretary-of-state-marco-rubio-national-security-advisor-mike-waltz-and-special-envoy-to-the-middle-east-steve-witkoff-with-jennifer-hansler-of-cnn-and-matthew-lee-of-the-associated-press/

[13] https://isw.pub/UkrWar021825

[14] https://abcnews.go.com/International/ukrainian-official-suggests-us-mineral-deal-terms-improved/story?id=119199649; https://isw.pub/UkrWar022125; https://isw.pub/UkrWar021925; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Vl-_9pOiAl0; https://suspilne dot media/957267-u-bilomu-domi-zaavili-so-putin-bude-zmusenij-piti-na-postupki-u-zakincenni-vijni-rf-proti-ukraini/

[15] https://isw.pub/UkrWar021625; https://isw.pub/UkrWar021325; https://isw.pub/UkrWar020625; https://isw.pub/UkrWar013125;

[16] https://www.state.gov/secretary-of-state-marco-rubio-with-brian-kilmeade-of-fox-news/

[17] https://isw.pub/UkrWar022125; https://isw.pub/UkrWar021925; https://isw.pub/UkrWar021625

[18] https://t.me/rybar/68371 ; https://t.me/yurasumy/21413 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/65418 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/86938

[19] https://t.me/mod_russia/49426 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/49419 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/49420

[20] https://t.me/belarusian_silovik/50088; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/24449 ; https://t.me/rybar/68371 ; https://t.me/z_arhiv/30961

[21] https://t.me/tass_agency/302756 ; https://t.me/yurasumy/21413 ; https://t.me/sashakots/52153

[22] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/86935

[23] https://t.me/rybar/68371

[24] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/21438; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/21390; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/5735; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/24470 

[25] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/21438; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/21390; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/21387; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/5735; https://t.me/tass_agency/302673

[26] https://t.me/rybar/68368

[27] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/21391?single 

[28] https://t.me/z_arhiv/30965

[29] ttps://t.me/rybar/68368

[30] https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=2749534968574997; https://suspilne dot media/lutsk/957755-bijci-14-brigadi-z-volini-znisili-sklad-boepripasiv-na-kupanskomu-napramku/

[31] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/21438; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/21390; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/21387; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/5735

[32] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/21438; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/21390; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/21387; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/5735

[33] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/02/26/v-ekologichnomu-plani-cze-katastrofa-na-lymanskomu-napryamku-okupanty-vshhent-vypalyuyut-zemlyu/; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=o4XONrDJWsc

[34] https://t.me/usf_army/443; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/02/25/syly-bezpilotnyh-system-znyshhyly-rosijskyj-zrk-yakyj-mig-urazhaty-czili-na-vidstani-do-5-km/ 

[35] https://t.me/RKadyrov_95/5519

[36] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/21390 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/21387 ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/5735

[37] https://t.me/motopatriot78/32818

[38] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/21438 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/21390 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/21387 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/24995 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/302680

[39] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/8494; https://t.me/slovianskbrigade/674

[40] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/21438 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/21390 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/21387 ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/5735

[41] https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/1894676996975726765; https://www.tiktok.com/@evil_punisher4/video/7475409508873850118

[42] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/21438 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/21390; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/21387; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/5735; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/62425; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/62445; https://t.me/motopatriot78/32821; https://t.me/motopatriot78/32822; https://t.me/dva_majors/65418; https://t.me/yurasumy/21400  

[43] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/62425; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/62445; https://t.me/rybar/68350  ; https://t.me/yurasumy/21400  

[44] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/8492; https://t.me/urga_74/3681

[45] https://t.me/motopatriot78/32822; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/86913 ; https://t.me/z_arhiv/30979; https://t.me/rybar/68350  ; https://t.me/yurasumy/21400

[46] https://t.me/rybar/68350  

[47] https://suspilne dot media/donbas/957569-sili-oboroni-vidbili-naselenij-punkt-kotline-bila-pokrovska-25-opdbr/ ; https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=577610905306488&rdid=LBoB7h0Qj7TB7QIX  ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/5740

[48] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-25-2025; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/62425; https://t.me/motopatriot78/32821

[49] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/62436

[50] https://t.me/motopatriot78/32821; https://t.me/motopatriot78/32822

[51] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/21438; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/21390; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/21387; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/5735; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/62427; https://t.me/wargonzo/24995; https://t.me/dva_majors/65418; https://t.me/sashakots/52154; https://t.me/yurasumy/21399

[52] https://t [dot] me/GeneralStaffZSU/21391?single

[53] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/8488; https://t.me/oaembr46/1379

[54] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/62434; https://t.me/motopatriot78/32851; https://t.me/voin_dv/13622

[55] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/21390; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/21387; https://t.me/dva_majors/65418

[56] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/21391?single

[57] https://t.me/tass_agency/302708; https://t.me/yurasumy/21398; https://t.me/motopatriot78/32859; https://t.me/z_arhiv/30973

[58] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/21438; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/21438; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/21390; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/21387; https://www.facebook.com/OperationalCommandSouth/posts/pfbid05vSwWk72AYB672U5TpVyxcvb4GmMYVaMSuwBWvSP18yrfes4bZtd3hGsp6v9mUgml; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/62429

[59] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/21391?single

[60] https://t.me/motopatriot78/32833; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/62429

[61] https://www.facebook.com/OperationalCommandSouth/posts/pfbid05vSwWk72AYB672U5TpVyxcvb4GmMYVaMSuwBWvSP18yrfes4bZtd3hGsp6v9mUgml

[62] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/86924

[63] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/21390; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/21387; https://www.facebook.com/OperationalCommandSouth/posts/pfbid05vSwWk72AYB672U5TpVyxcvb4GmMYVaMSuwBWvSP18yrfes4bZtd3hGsp6v9mUgml

[64] https://t.me/kpszsu/29513

[65] https://t.me/kpszsu/29513; https://t.me/Mykola_Kalashnyk/4597; https://t.me/synegubov/13234

[66] https://t.me/akovalenko1989/8878

[67] https://t.me/rybar/68359

[68] https://t.me/vasilii_piskarev/1789

[69] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-23-2024; https://isw.pub/UkrWar061624

[70] https://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Russian%20Offensive%20Campaign%20Assessment%2C%20January%209%2C%202025%20%28PDF%29.pdf; https://memorialcenter dot org/ru/news/v-taganroge-pytayut-zaklyuchennyh
Warning: disturbing and graphic content: https://zona dot media/article/2025/01/09/taganrog;

[71] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-25-2025

[72] https://www.coe.int/en/web/portal/-/the-russian-federation-is-excluded-from-the-council-of-europe; https://www.vedomosti dot ru/politics/articles/2025/02/26/1094632-v-gosdumu-vnesli

[73] https://t.me/tass_agency/302714

[74] https://tass dot ru/ekonomika/23245165

[75] https://belta dot by/society/view/parlament-rossii-ratifitsiroval-dogovor-s-belarusjju-o-garantijah-bezopasnosti-698651-2025/; https://tass dot ru/mezhdunarodnaya-panorama/23248193; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-6-2024

[76] https://lenta dot ru/news/2025/02/26/v-minske-ratifitsirovali-dogovor-po-sozdaniyu-rossiey-voennyh-ob-ektov-v-belorussii/; https://tass dot ru/mezhdunarodnaya-panorama/23248193; https://ria dot ru/20250226/belorussija-2001687353.html