Transnistria Suffers Russia’s Tough Love

The crisis in the small region of Transnistria, which has made daily life miserable for those the Kremlin claims to protect, should be an object lesson in Putin realpolitik. When Russia runs things, your country or region becomes a geopolitical plaything where your interests will always come second. At best.

So about 350,000 Transnistrians are now shivering in the dark for long periods at the height of winter because the Kremlin cut off its free energy supply. This wasn’t a forced decision, it was a choice. 

Why? Because Russia hopes the misery inflicted on Moldova (to which Transnistria belongs and to which it’s intimately connected) will increase poverty and misery and cause voters to blame its pro-Western government. This autumn parliamentary elections will give them the chance to decide who to blame for their suffering.

Russia has for many years supplied gas to the Transnistrian region, for no payment, where it’s used to generate energy for consumption in Moldova, at a price. But since Moscow turned off the taps at the new year, the roles have been reversed. Moldova buys supplies on the markets, especially from neighboring Romania, while the Transnistrian region struggles to stay warm.

There’s a cost to all this. Moldova has to pay more for alternative supplies. And that’s really the point (Russia’s claims of unpaid debt are grossly over-inflated.) As of 10 January, electricity prices have risen by around 70%. This has increased the economic burden of the population where rising prices are the main concern. It disproportionately affects low-income households. While the government has implemented a compensation system, around 30% of the population live in poverty.

The gas switch-off is not the first time Russia has tried to browbeat Moldova and its people (in 2022, Moscow reduced gas deliveries to Moldova by more than half), but it may be the last. Moldova was once reliant on Russian-supplied gas but has learnt its lesson and largely decoupled from Kremlin energy supplies. Regardless of the current crisis, Moldova’s contract with Gazprom expires in September 2026 and if pro-European parties remain in power, they will probably terminate the deal. 

Moldova now relies heavily on daily electricity imports from Romania, complemented by limited local generation and a growing contribution from renewable energy sources (10%-15%.) This shift has helped avoid a crisis.

The situation is far worse in Transnistria. With no gas supply, the MGRES power plant has switched to coal, which is projected to last for the next few days. To conserve resources public institutions have been disconnected from heating systems, rolling blackouts have been implemented, public services, including transport and hospitals, operate in reduced mode, and schools have extended holidays. Imports to the region have decreased by 43%, and exports have dropped by 60%, as production was either halted or cut.

Transnistrian leader Vadim Krasnoselsky announced Russia’s intention to supply sufficient humanitarian gas for the region’s consumption. Nothing has so far resulted and an unwilling Transnistria now accepted an offer of help from the European Union (EU) that includes $31m for both Moldova and Transnistria for the period 1-10 February, and a loan of 3 million cubic meters of gas provided to Transnistria by Moldovan authorities. 

The EU support will be used to buy gas for the Transnistrian region, including MGRES, and in exchange MGRES will supply free electricity to Moldova — leading to a decrease of prices. This short-term solution will bridge the gap for Transnistria, yet a long term sustainable solution is still to be presented. 

The crisis only highlights the unsustainable nature of Transnistria’s economy, which is reliant on free Russian gas and therefore Kremlin goodwill.

A failure to aid Transnistria from its Putin-induced mess has other implications. If the energy crisis worsened, there could be an influx of Transnistrian residents to Moldova, creating a humanitarian crisis. More than 90% of Transnistria residents are Moldovan citizens. This would stretch the country’s resources. 

Russia’s energy blackmailing is part of its broader geopolitical strategy to destabilize Moldova and influence both its domestic and foreign policy. Since launching its full-scale war in Ukraine, Moscow has intensified hybrid warfare against Moldova through its FSB spy agency and including multi-million dollar disinformation campaigns, interference in presidential elections, and attempts to undermine the EU referendum.

It seems likely that pro-Russian candidates will leverage the crisis by promising lower energy costs if elected, exploiting voters’ economic vulnerabilities while seeking to encourage Transnistrian electors to use their votes in the Moldovan ballot. 

It is crucial for Moldova to prioritize energy diversification, enhance security, and foster regional cooperation. At the same time, the crisis offers an opportunity for Moldova to reframe its relationship with Transnistria, preparing for future reintegration in a way that is both strategic and sustainable, including a vision on energy policy that includes Transnistria and minimizes Russia’s influence.  

Anastasia Pociumban is a Research Fellow at the German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP), where she leads the Think Tank Network on the Eastern Partnership. Her work focuses on EU enlargement and the EU’s relations with its eastern neighbors. She is a former Denton Fellow with the Center for European Policy Analysis (CEPA.)

Europe’s Edge is CEPA’s online journal covering critical topics on the foreign policy docket across Europe and North America. All opinions are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the position or views of the institutions they represent or the Center for European Policy Analysis.