Following a dramatic meeting in the White House, U.S. military support for Ukraine is perilously uncertain. Sustaining Ukraine in this war, and afterwards, is a responsibility that Europe will have to shoulder sooner rather than later. Washington may now cut support for Ukraine well before any agreement is reached and try to compel Ukraine to accept an unstable ceasefire. This will leave Ukraine in a perpetual state of insecurity, and Europe bracing for a possible renewal of the war. There is a significant risk that following a cessation in large-scale combat operations Russia continues its effort to destabilize Ukraine politically, pressure it economically, and set the conditions for a third war on far more favorable terms for Moscow. To prevent this, the Ukrainian military will need to be sustained in the field and reconstituted, while Russia is effectively deterred.
It is increasingly less likely that the United States will continue extending military or financial assistance, with Washington’s policy objective to shift the burden onto European capitals. Despite President Volodymyr Zelensky’s efforts, the United States has made it clear that it does not intend to offer Ukraine security guarantees or directly contribute to any forces supporting Ukraine after the imposition of a ceasefire. It therefore falls upon Europe to plan for such a force. This is a serious undertaking. Can European powers field such a force without hollowing out Europe’s ability to defend NATO’s borders, all while the United States potentially withdraws forces from the continent?
While the length of front and the size of Russian ground forces may give the impression that the task is infeasible, in our view it is practicable if European nations are willing to pay the cost. With the right force balance, investment, and political framework Europe could generate a credible commitment.
There is nothing fantastical about a European mission in Ukraine. France and the United Kingdom are considering such a proposal and, as recent reporting suggests, have discussed it during President Emmanuel Macron’s recent visit to Washington. Turkey may be open to contributing to such a force as well. Indeed, while Zelensky’s meeting with Trump in Washington was a catastrophe, it may have increased European will to do much more than it might have otherwise. However, the conversation remains ill-informed in terms of requirements, either implying that a token force will be sufficient or inflating the necessary troop levels to a point that renders such a policy impossible. We seek to set a realistic marker for what would be required if Europe were to deploy forces in Ukraine.
Bounding the Mission
NATO is more secure with Russia facing an independent Ukraine with a credible military. Attacking NATO under these circumstances would leave Ukraine on Russia’s flank, while reducing the frontage over which Russia poses a threat. The first vital mission is therefore to partner with the armed forces of Ukraine to train and support their reconstitution, including the regeneration of a reserve and mobilization system in circumstances where many veterans have left the force.
The size of Ukraine, and the extensive front line, spanning over 750 miles (1200 kilometers) can lead one to presume that the requirements for a force are beyond the means of NATO’s European militaries. Yet what Ukraine needs is not a traditional peacekeeping or separation force which has to be stretched along the line of contact. As such, it’s not about the size of the front. Although European leaders may call it a “peacekeeping” force, this is not going to be a traditional U.N. peacekeeping mission. The force would serve two functions. First, assure Ukraine. With Western backing, Ukraine should be able to maintain a force sufficient to man, or patrol, key sectors of the front line. Second, enhance deterrence against future aggression from Russia through both the capability deployed and the inherent risk of directly engaging Western forces.
The multinational task force envisioned does not need to be everywhere in Ukraine. It needs to have a presence on three directions, and with sufficient mobility to redeploy as necessary along the front. Any future Russian attack would invariably be along several predictable directions. Today, most of the fighting is concentrated typically along three to four sectors of the front at a time. Hence, a relatively small force package can be sufficient for introducing risk into Russian calculus. The most obvious directions would be Kyiv, Kharkiv, and Donetsk. Western formations would deploy to these regions not as frontline troops, but as supporting echelons backing Ukrainian forces.
A European commitment would also help avoid a worst-case scenario after any ceasefire, in which Ukraine sees itself as abandoned without any security commitment or Western military presence. The army will demobilize and many of the men may then leave abroad, which would shrink the force significantly. Essentially, this is also about Ukrainians seeing that they have a future and that, in the event of another Russian invasion, they also have a chance.
Deploying Forces
Given the significant degradation in Russian force quality over the course of the last three years of fighting, the initial force deployed could be as few as three combat brigades, or their equivalents. The force may need to grow over time as Russia reconstitutes. This would amount to perhaps 15,000 to 20,000 personnel in country, with another 30,000 to 40,000 required for sustained rotation, for a total of 45,000 to 60,000 troops. A notional force structure would include a divisional headquarters, three maneuver brigades, a logistics brigade, and a fires brigade. Conversely, nations could set up their own national support elements in place of a logistics brigade.
This effort should also envision moving the multinational INTERFLEX training mission for Ukrainian troops, currently running in the United Kingdom, into Ukraine. Britain’s 11 Security Force Assistance Brigade, which is the unit at the core of that effort, should also be deployed. This would address Ukraine’s longtime request for greater in-country training of its forces, and adaptation of its basic training regimen. Keeping the force size manageable will be a challenge. Multinational formations tend to be larger than the mission requirements, because of duplication of functions between units, separate support elements for individual nation’s unique logistical requirements, and everyone wanting a seat at the table in the headquarters.
European leaders may worry what will happen if this force is engaged by Russian strike capabilities. There is a somewhat fraught discussion at present about the need for robust air defenses. Yet the war has shown that dispersal is highly effective, as is entrenchment, and Ukrainian air defense (much of it Western systems) intercepts a significant percentage of Russian strikes. If anything, the experience has illustrated that air and missile defenses are more effective than expected, while a force that is properly dispersed is a very unattractive target for prestige strike systems. A multinational force could manage its footprint in country to make itself a hard target, in much the same way as hundreds of thousands of Ukrainian troops do every day. Indeed, mass casualty events are rare, even relatively close to the front line. If losses take place from skirmishes, or incidents, there’s no reason they would lead to a war with Russia, and in many similar cases have not in the past.
Sustaining this presence in Ukraine would mean that European nations would have to revisit existing commitments to rapid reaction forces, and those made under NATO regional defense plans. But Europe has the capacity to do this and given the recently made pledges to increase defense spending, could certainly increase it sufficiently to meet both a sustained deployment in Ukraine and other commitments over time.
The force as conceived would be a multinational division, operating under its own command. Units in the rear could help train Ukrainian forces, conduct joint exercises, and support other activities while learning from Ukrainian experience. Western forces could also be backed by their own airpower, based within the territory of bordering NATO members. This is a comparative advantage for countries like the United Kingdom and France, which have significant airpower available that’s largely uncommitted to other missions. This would provide a visible force multiplier, and additional air protection for units in-country. However, the mission would be under European, rather than Ukrainian command. Such a force would be additive given existing Ukrainian military capability. It would backstop Ukrainian forces manning the line of contact, rather than serving as the principal deterrent in the theatre.
The current British and French plan being discussed to deploy a force of up to 30,000 personnel suggest that while such a commitment is beyond the existing resource envelope of European NATO members, it is not beyond what is envisaged by European leaders. The question is whether they are prepared to underwrite the costs. So far European leaders have not been prepared to match their rhetorical commitments with resources. Notably, some nations with significant military capability, like Poland, appear to be reticent to be security providers. The majority contributors should not be frontline states, who have their own significant defense requirements. Therefore, Western Europe should take the leading role, ideally with Turkish participation.
There is a degree of fretting about the impact of such a deployment on NATO’s deterrence posture. However, frontline states should avoid engaging in beggar-thy-neighbor politics when it comes to European security. A European mission in Ukraine need not come at their expense. Furthermore, if European nations are incapable of collectively deploying one multinational division, then this should raise broader questions about European commitment to European security. The risk of inaction is much greater for Europe than the risk inherent in deploying a force into theatre that could be attacked, or otherwise challenged.
Managing Contingency
The question that will dominate discussions over whether to pursue such a policy is what happens if Russia attacks Ukraine. The deployed force would not be protected by NATO’s Article 5 and would not have the backing of the United States. First, in such a scenario, the mass of the force would be provided by the Ukrainian military. The goal of this proposal is not to shift the burden of deterrence and defense from the Ukrainian military onto Europe, but to enhance Ukraine’s existing capability. Whereas the Ukrainian military lacked an effective higher echelon of command, struggled to train its forces, or to coordinate fires beyond 30 kilometers during the current conflict, mentoring by European militaries could significantly strengthen aspects of operations, such that Russia would be dealing with a more capable and integrated force.
The second critical aspect of the force’s credibility would be the contribution of European air power. The Russo-Ukrainian War has demonstrated that it is possible to overcome Russian air defenses. The problem has been the scale at which such operations can be conducted and the limitations on Ukraine’s ability to exploit the gaps it creates. Europe has modern fleets of combat aircraft. Only a sliver of this capacity is used for current “air policing” missions, and out of area deployments. With appropriate training, and munitions, in a time of war these forces could suppress the Russian Aerospace Forces and offer decisive firepower to Ukrainian forces. Either way, it would add the risk to Russian considerations that European airpower might be involved in a future fight.
It will be objected that European air forces currently lack the training, munitions, or command-and-control infrastructure to execute such operations. This is in some cases correct. And initially, U.S. support may be necessary when it comes to logistical and organizational capacity. But addressing such a glaring set of deficiencies is vital to restoring NATO’s conventional deterrence posture and this is a solvable problem. Indeed, it is the problem Europe should be solving, and the foremost priority for European investment into their militaries. Making European airpower useable against its primary threat should be a driver of force planning across the continent irrespective of commitments made to Ukraine.
What of potential Russian opposition? Depending on the mandate of the force, and how this mission is framed, Moscow may accept it as part of an armistice. President Donald Trump said that he had raised the idea of peacekeepers with President Vladimir Putin as part of a deal and his impression was that “Yeah, he will accept it,” adding “I’ve asked him that question.” Russia’s Foreign Minister, Sergei Lavrov, has said though that “we cannot consider any options” when it comes to European peacekeepers, ruling it out. Hence Russia may strongly object to such a force if it is proposed in negotiations. So long, however, as a commitment is not made to exclude European forces from Ukraine after a ceasefire, then it is doubtful that a Russian military that is currently struggling to break through Ukrainian defenses would be immediately recommitted to the attack should Ukrainians on the line of contact be reinforced from European militaries. In short, Moscow may protest, but it is not clear in such a scenario that it could prevent such a policy being implemented.
The policy set out above would require significant investment and the political determination by European states that they were prepared to fight for Ukraine. It will also require reprioritization, at least in the interim, when looking at their current commitments. Strategically there is a compelling case that it is better to prevent the subjugation of Ukraine than face an emboldened Russia elsewhere on the continent. Politically, this is a matter for the member states. However, current debate on this topic veers between vague security commitments without any reference to the necessary force requirements, and wild statements of troop requirements that make the proposition insurmountable. A more careful examination of what it takes demonstrates that it is possible, but will be costly in resources and political will.
Jack Watling is senior research fellow for land warfare at the Royal United Services Institute.
Michael Kofman is a senior fellow at Carnegie Endowment.
Image: U.K. Ministry of Defense
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