Media Briefing: Trump, Russia, and the Future of Ukraine

CHANG: Welcome, everyone, to today’s Council on Foreign Relations briefing on “The Future of Ukraine.” As Hannah said, this briefing will be on the record. A recording will be posted online at the conclusion of the discussion. 

The Council seeks to inform U.S. engagement with the world, and does through—does so through briefings such as this and the up-to-date analysis and resources addressing the issues of the day posted across our channels, including on CFR.org and ForeignAffairs.com. Online, you will find resources including a rolodex, if you will, of CFR experts, policy briefs, special reports, media hits, Foreign Affairs articles, and the like. Please continue to turn to the Council as a resource as we navigate these times and these issues going forward. 

We have a robust lineup of Council experts today. Unfortunately, our colleague Liana Fix could not join us at the last minute, but we look forward to sharing her analysis and expertise in the days to come. 

With that, over to Mike Froman, president of the Council on Foreign Relations. 

FROMAN: Thanks, Ben. And thank you all for joining us. 

Needless to say, these last couple of weeks have been a remarkably dynamic period not only for Ukraine and the Ukrainian issue, but for European security more generally and, indeed, fundamental elements of the international security architecture. 

Several months ago, we launched here at the Council a Special Initiative on Securing Ukraine’s Future. It’s led by Senior Fellow Paul Stares, who’s your moderator today, and it involves several of the fellows who are speaking today along others like Liana. The initiative focuses, really, on three areas: achieving peace, how can a just and durable peace deal be reached; preparing for and realizing Ukraine’s reconstruction and economic recovery, what needs to be done to boost economic growth and rebuilt critical infrastructure; and thirdly, building a framework for Europe’s long-term security. 

The initiative has produced a number of, in my view, cutting-edge reports. I hope you’ll take advantage of them. You’ll hear about some of the work today. And all of this is made possibly by the support of the Wachenheim Program on Peace and Security, and we’re very grateful to Susan and Edgar Wachenheim for their—for their support of the Council more broadly. 

With that, let me turn it over to Paul Stares, our moderator and the chair of our Council’s Special Initiative on Securing Ukraine’s Future. Over to you, Paul. 

STARES: OK. Well, thank you, Mike. Let me add my welcome to you all to this CFR media briefing on “Trump, Russia, and the Future of Ukraine.” I’m Paul Stares, as Mike said, senior fellow here at the Council, and where I also coordinate the Special Initiative on Securing Ukraine’s Future. 

I think to say the least the statements and actions of President Trump and senior members of his administration toward Russia, Ukraine, and Europe over this past week have been truly head-spinning, jaw-dropping, gob-smacking, stomach-churning—pick your metaphor. While there are doubtless some who agree with what has been said and done, I think it’s fair to say that many of us feel deep unease about what this all means for Ukraine and for the transatlantic alliance in general. There have been many crises over the last seventy-five years over Europe’s security, and it would be easy to say that this is just yet another one, but to many of us I think this feels different and it could be even conceivably existential in its consequences. 

To try to make sense of what has been happening this past week, I’m joined by three very knowledgeable and experienced colleagues. 

Charlie Kupchan, senior fellow for Europe here at CFR and a professor of IR—international relations—at Georgetown. Charlie was the senior director for Europe at the NSC during the Obama administration. 

Secondly, Tom Graham, who’s a distinguished fellow focusing on Russia and also a professor at Yale. He, too, has held many senior positions in the U.S. government at the State Department and the NSC. 

And standing in for Liana Fix we have Steve Sestanovich, the George F. Kennan senior fellow here at the Council, who has also served in many senior positions in the U.S. government. 

Just a reminder that our session is on the record.  

So without further ado, let me turn first to Charlie. I want to you to kind of set the scene here and try to interpret what the Trump administration and his senior advisors are trying to accomplish with what they have done and said over the last week. What is, kind of, the immediate goal here? Is there a longer-term objective that they have in mind? Is it just sort of shock and awe to more or less fulfill his campaign promise and to bring peace to Ukraine, and to get the Europeans to do more? Or are we talking about a much more fundamental reorientation of U.S. foreign policy? So that’s a lot to address, but give us your sense of what you think is going on here and driving these remarkable actions and statements by senior U.S. officials over the last week? Over to you. 

KUPCHAN: Thanks, Paul. Let me begin by echoing your comment and agreeing with it, that the last week or so, when it comes to transatlantic relations, Ukraine-Russia, has been head spinning. And I think that’s not unintended, in the sense that the Trump administration believes that it has a mandate to disrupt, challenge the political establishment, and to turn everything upside down. And it is so far doing a pretty good job of that.  

That having been said, I do support, in principle, the Trump administration’s decision to try to negotiate an end to the war in Ukraine, and in principle the decision to open a direct dialog between Washington and Moscow, including a phone call between Trump and Putin and the meeting that took place in Riyadh just a few days ago, where Secretary Rubio and Secretary Lavrov began a conversation. I think this is overdue. I think we’ve known for quite some time that Ukraine is not going to win this war. And I think that reasonable people could come together around a redefinition of a successful outcome to this war, which would be, at least in my mind, that the 80 percent of Ukraine that is still free emerges as a success story, as a defensible, secure, prosperous democracy. And I think that should be the aim of American diplomacy in the months ahead. 

Even though, however, I support the outreach to Russia and believe that the direct bilateral dialog between Russia and the United States is essential to ending the war, I also find it very puzzling—maybe the right word is mystifying—about several other dimensions of Trump’s policies that have—that have come to light in the last ten days or so. First, at least from my perspective—and I’m guessing my colleagues will agree with this—the Trump administration does not seem to have a strategy. It seems to have an impulse: Let’s end the war. Let’s talk to the Russians.  

But having been in Munich over the last weekend and listened to J.D. Vance, and listened to Keith Kellogg, and listened to other American officials, I could not even begin to describe what strategy the administration is putting in place. And I think there’s a reason for that. And that’s that it doesn’t exist. And that’s one of the reasons I think that the various players here—whether it’s the secretary of defense, the secretary of state, or the National Security Advisor Mr. Witkoff—they’re not singing on the same—off the same sheet of music, because there’s no sheet of music.  

The second criticism that I would level is that the Trump administration has given away the store before the negotiations have even begun, taking NATO membership off the table, saying that Ukraine should give up on the 2014 borders, saying there’ll be no U.S. boots on the ground, talking almost gleefully about rebuilding U.S.-Russia business ties at a time when the sanctions are still in place. This is putting the cart before the horse. These are all issues that should be held in reserve to negotiate once you have a serious conversation going around a serious strategy that has been worked with Ukraine and worked with the European allies. That hasn’t happened yet.  

And then finally, this will be my last comment, Paul, there has been an enormous amount of unnecessary damage, I would say own-goals, scored at the level of atmospherics. The tit for tat insults that have passed between Trump and Zelensky over the last forty-eight hours are very damaging. Trump needs Zelensky. Zelensky needs Trump. This kind of mutual insult game only plays into the hands of Russia at a time when the Trump administration should be doing everything to increase Ukraine’s leverage, not undermine it. And then the insults to the allies are completely unnecessary. J.D. Vance’s speech was in some ways bone chilling. I mean, was very condescending, very insulting to the conference gathering in Munich.  

And I think it’s raised fundamental questions among our European allies about what the United States is up to, whether it still has a reliable partner in the United States, at a time when, if we’re going to actually negotiate an end to the war, the United States and its allies need to be moving in lockstep. So in principle, I appreciate what Trump is trying to do. In practice, it is a big, hot mess.  

STARES: OK. Let me turn to you, Tom. You’ve obviously being following this renewed U.S.-Russia relationship. Charlie mentioned we’ve already had an exchange of phone calls, an initial meeting in Saudi Arabia. What do you see as the next steps here? And what do you see as the sort of principal issues or stumbling blocks in what seems to be President Trump’s intentions to bring an early end to the war in Ukraine?  

GRAHAM: Yeah. Thank you, Paul.  

Let me start and take a step back and make one sort of broad point. From the Russian standpoint, these discussions are not simply about Ukraine. Ukraine is embedded in the larger question of European security. And for the Russians they’re looking for a dialog with the United States across a broad range of issues, something that the presidents talked about in their phone call. The Middle East, energy security, the Arctic, strategic stability, and so forth. So they’re looking at a restoration of a more or less normal diplomatic relationship with the United States.  

Second point, when it comes specifically to Ukraine. The Russians have made it clear, and President Putin has made it clear repeatedly, that they are not interested in a simple ceasefire. President Putin wants what he calls an enduring settlement. And he wants to have a settlement that deals with what he calls the root causes of the conflict. You know, my understanding is he spent a considerable amount of time with Steve Witkoff when Witkoff was in Moscow laying out those concerns to make sure that the American side, and President Trump in particular, understood that a simple ceasefire was not going to cut it, as far as the Russians are concerned.  

Now, where the Russians are at this point is waiting to see what the American team will look like. I was in Moscow last week. Tremendous amount of questions about who was really going to run the policy on the U.S. side. Tremendous surprise that, when the president talked about the people who were going to manage this for him, Keith Kellogg’s name was not on that list. If you looked at the meeting in Riyadh, it’s not clear, again, who is going to maintain or carry the weight of this—of this new dialog. Is it going to be between the ministers of foreign affairs? Where do the national security advisors fit in? Where does Steve Witkoff fit in? And who would talk to him on the Russian side? So the Russians are still waiting for the United States to actually set up some sort of team to carry out a more thoroughgoing discussion with them, again, on a whole range of issues.  

You know, when it comes specifically, again, to Ukraine, the sticking points, I think, going forward are going to be two major ones—territory and Ukraine’s geopolitical orientation. From the Russian standpoint, a ceasefire along the line of contact at this point is not satisfactory. That will leave territory that the Russians consider sovereign Russian territory in the hands of the Ukrainians—in Kherson, Zaporizhzhia, Donetsk in particular. You know, from the Ukrainian position that is their territory. And they want the 1991 borders, although they realize they can’t get those militarily at this point. So where that line is drawn is going to be important to Russia.  

And the second, and I was told in Moscow this is going to be the toughest issue, is what happens to that part of Ukraine that is not occupied by Russia whenever a settlement is reached? It’s quite clear from the Russian standpoint that President Putin wants to control Ukraine, and all of Ukraine. That he wants control over Ukraine’s geopolitical orientation, to a limited extent its domestic politics. That his vision of a future Ukraine that’s beyond Russia’s physical control is along the lines of the relationship that Belarus has with Russia at this point. I think from the American standpoint, as Charlie has already mentioned, we have a different vision for the future of Ukraine. At a minimum our goal has to be the preservation of a sovereign, independent Ukraine that has a Western orientation, on whatever territory Kyiv controls at the end of this conflict.  

How you reconcile those two diverging visions, I think, is quite difficult. That will be the sticking point. And I think the Russians are in a position now where they realize that there will be a problem, they’re just not sure when it will emerge because they’re not sure how the negotiations are actually going to unfold over the next several weeks. 

STARES: OK. Let me turn now to Steve Sestanovich. Steve, as Charlie said at the outset, relations between President Trump and Zelensky have deteriorated, to say the least. (Laughs.) I think that’s an understatement. They’ve been trading very strong language at each other, particularly by President Trump. Is this relationship irredeemable now? And one of the, I think, terms that seem to be on the table is that Ukraine conduct a national election immediately. I think there’s great consternation about that. And I guess the third one, perhaps this—I should have mentioned this at the outset—there seems to be no intention to include Ukraine in the negotiations about a ceasefire. And so will anything agreed between the United States and Russia actually mean anything, if Ukraine is essentially not part of the—of the discussion? So there’s a lot to unpack there. I’m sorry to throw everything at you, but you can pick and choose what of those questions you would most like to address. 

SESTANOVICH: OK, great. Thanks, Paul.  

I’d add only one postscript to what Thomas said about the Russian reaction, which is celebration and joy. You know, the Russians are, at least publicly, talking about being, as someone once said, dizzy with success. Now, about the Trump-Zelensky relationship, and more broadly the Trump team’s relationship with Ukraine, you know, it’s experienced a lot of sudden tension and name calling. And the Ukrainians are angry and confused by what they—what has been said to and about them. I think in a way the most stinging part of it, though, gets directly to the question that you raise, which is the relationship between the two presidents, Zelensky and Trump. 

Vice President Vance said about Zelensky yesterday—I’m paraphrasing a little bit—don’t get too uppity; how dare you talk to the president—or, talk about the president of the United States that way. This is when the president of the United States has called him a dictator. They’re basically saying to the Ukrainians, you can talk to us privately, but I don’t want to hear—we don’t want to hear anything from you in public. 

I think this misunderstands what Zelensky’s role has to be and what he surely sees as his role. He has different audiences. He has of course the administration—that’s only one. There are three other important ones that I’d mention that they are trying to reach out to. One is of course their domestic audience. Another is European governments, and another is those in the U.S. outside the Trump team, in the Congress, in the commentariat.  
So far the impact at home for Zelensky has been what you might expect—rallying around the president, denouncing Trump, denouncing the idea that there’s any comparison between Putin and Zelensky, and in particular rejecting the idea that Trump has raised that there has to be an election for Trump—for Zelensky to be a legitimate president. This is entirely an invention—you know, a sort of teasing and mischievous one on Putin’s part. I don’t think this will really be an obstacle to interaction—or, to negotiations. But in Ukraine, major political figures—pro-Zelensky and also his rivals—have said absolutely we don’t want an election while martial law is still in place. 

Zelensky’s domestic—I mean, European audience, of course, is going to be well represented in Washington next week with the visits of President Macron and Prime Minister Starmer. He will be counting on them and will be reaching out to them between now and their visits to try to get them to be his advocates. He wants the administration to hear that Europeans reject this way of talking about Ukraine, and even more to the point, reject the suggested approach excluding Ukraine from negotiations, not listening to their point of view about the terms of any settlement, and disparaging Zelensky. 

What I think is most striking, if you step back from the confusion and the nastiness of the past few days, is how little the administration has said about providing for support for Ukraine in the future, and in particular for Ukrainian security. There has not really been any commentary on whether the United States would be prepared to offer support for a European peacekeeping contingent in Ukraine if it materializes. There has been nothing said about other forms of security assistance in the future. There has been nothing said about cooperation between Western defense industry and Ukraine’s innovative—own innovative defense industry. There has been nothing said about economic support for Ukraine in the future, and of course nothing on the actual terms of a ceasefire settlement. 

In other words, the administration has said not one word about Charlie’s definition of success, which is a prosperous, successful, secure, democratic Ukraine. They have—quite apart from whether they have a strategy on it—I completely agree with Charlie that they don’t—they don’t have any content and have offered nothing in the way of support for Ukraine going forward. 

All of these topics will be the focus of Ukraine’s efforts in the coming days or however long it is between now and the Trump meeting, and then of course after that. 

STARES: So, I want to open this up to folks at the briefing to ask us questions. I have one final one, and it’s focused mainly on you, Charlie, but others can jump in. 

So there’s sort of broad expectation that the Trump administration wants to see the Europeans take more responsibility if not sole responsibility for supporting Ukraine in the aftermath of a ceasefire, and there’s been various ideas floated here. And I’d like to get your sense, Charlie, how realistic these ideas are, given the pretty poor state of Europe’s own sort of military capabilities and dependence on the U.S. But also a kind of larger question, which is the expectation or demand, if they even—the Europeans do more for European security more generally going forward. 

And so maybe start with you, Charlie. Give us your sense of how realistic it is for Europe certainly in the short term to respond to the Trump administration’s demands here, and maybe the others in terms of how they see the long-term relationship between the U.S. and Europe unfolding as a result of this. 

KUPCHAN: J.D. Vance said in Munich—one thing I did agree with was that in many respects the most acute threat that we face right now is internal. It’s not Putin, it’s not China. He was referring to liberal, left, democratic politics in Europe. My concern is sort of the opposite, that what we’re witnessing on both sides of the Atlantic is the erosion of the political center. And if you just think about what’s happened in Europe over the last few months, it’s pretty worrying, with Starmer getting elected and then plunging in the polls; the French government collapsing; the German government collapsing; Romania holding an election that gets cancelled by the courts, either because he was too far right or because of interference from Russia or China, who knows. 

But you’re right, Paul, that the political state of affairs right now on both sides of the Atlantic is not great. And so it’s not inconceivable to me that we are sort of witnessing the erosion of the French and German political centers. I won’t—I won’t quote him by name, but a prominent German that I had dinner with the other night said, will the center hold here? And his answer was, it’s up to the next government; this will be the last chance. 
And so the—you know, if the question is, is Europe about to rise to the occasion, fill the gap that’s being left behind by Trump and Trump’s America first—no, it’s just not there. It’s not ready to do that. It is not in sufficiently good political health to pull that off. 

Will—under the best of circumstances, might there be a rebalancing, with the U.S. doing less and Europe more? Yes, incrementally, over time. But that has to be a kind of mediated, carefully orchestrated process, not one in which the United States packs its bags and goes home. 

Specifically on your question about the deployment of troops, you know, I would say, I can envisage some kind of troop presence in Ukraine in the aftermath of a ceasefire. It’s very controversial. When Macron gathered folks together in Paris after the Munich conference, there wasn’t a consensus. One of the leading countries when it comes to Ukraine is Poland. Poland has equivocated on this issue. But I can imagine some coalition of the willing coming together to put boots on the ground with perhaps air support, logistical support, and intel support from the United States. And that, I think, is essential. It won’t happen without that kind of backstop from the United States. 

And so right now I would say top priorities, Trump needs to do homework. He needs to sit down with the Ukrainians and he needs to sit down with the Europeans and actually create a strategy and a plan that I think all three of us agree just doesn’t exist yet, get that plan, cook it, and then start negotiating with the Russians. That’s the best-case scenario. Let’s give it a shot. 

STARES: OK. 

SESTANOVICH: Paul, can I just say that the current issue of Foreign Affairs— 

STARES: I was going to do the same. (Laughs.) 

SESTANOVICH: —has an answer to Charlie’s question. On the cover it says, “the center will not hold.” 

STARES: OK. (Laughter.) 

SESTANOVICH: My proposal is we actually stop pontificating and see if there are questions. 

STARES: Yeah. I just wanted to ask Tom, since he has— 

GRAHAM: Let me just make a brief point. The Russians will not accept anything that we’ve been talking about just now, about troops on the ground and so forth. 

STARES: That was my question. 

GRAHAM: But that’s why you have to negotiate. That’s why we have to have a plan. We need to have the leverage to get that accepted by the Russians, and that comes down to the toughest question: What is going to happen to that part of Ukraine that Russia does not control? And we need to have a serious plan to put on the table in negotiations with the Russians. 

SESTANOVICH: And I’d add one other thing to that. That’s why—because the Russians are unlikely to accept this, and because you have to have a lot of negotiation, there shouldn’t be anything more given to the Russians in advance for free. I mean, the Trump administration seems to think that offering up concessions for free is a good strategy. I suspect this group would disagree. (Laughter.) 

STARES: OK. We’re going to open it up now to those on the call. We particularly welcome questions from members of the media here. And I’m going to hand over to Hannah, who I think is going to essentially orchestrate the Q&A from here on out. 

OPERATOR: Absolutely. 

(Gives queuing instructions.) 

Another reminder that this meeting is on the record. 

We will take our first question from Anthony Borden. 

Q: (Inaudible.) 

OPERATOR: Anthony, please press the unmute button or prompt. 

No worries. We will take our next question from Doyle McManus. 

Q: Thank you. Can you hear me now? 

STARES: Yeah. We can hear you, Doyle. 

Q: That’s terrific. Doyle McManus from the Los Angeles Times. 

I thought that Steve Sestanovich’s point was rather telling that the administration has said nothing at all about the goals that Charlie Kupchan laid out: a prosperous, successful, democratic Ukraine. Nothing—not only nothing, I would note, about the specific concrete steps that would have to be taken to reach those, but really hasn’t said very much about the principle to begin with. I think the secretary of state and Mike Waltz have occasionally mentioned it. I don’t think President Trump or Vice President Vance have, even as a bedrock principle going in. How significant or worrisome might that omission be? 

And I would also note that in his tweet yesterday the president said if Mr. Zelensky doesn’t act fast he may not have a country at all. That sounded to me a little bit like I have a very generous 50 percent of your wealth offer on the table and those are the table stakes for still having an independent Ukraine. That’s a—put a question mark on the end of that. 

Thank you.  

STARES: Tom? Steve? Do you want to go for that?  

KUPCHAN: I think it’s true that when all of these figures to the extent there’s any sort of common language that you mentioned leading administration spokesmen talk about Ukraine in the future they tend to say things like sovereign and independent. They tend not to elaborate in the way that you and Charlie mentioned, and I think that’s because their focus is very much on the end of the fighting with the implication or at least the possible implication that they see that as the end of American involvement.  

They don’t actually think about a future framework in which Ukraine will be able to succeed in the ways that we’ve been talking about and that, to my mind, is not just an intellectual error but it’s a strategic one because it means they haven’t really thought about what it will take to get a settlement that lasts.  

I don’t think they really address the question of how long they need to have the settlement last. 

GRAHAM: I would just add, if I could, that I don’t know, Doyle, what Trump has in his mind. You know, I think that when you talk about, say, Rubio or Waltz they would probably sign up to the definition of success that we’re talking about.  

I don’t know that Trump on some level doesn’t sympathize with Russia. You know, when he said the other day that you, Mr. Zelensky, caused this war I read that not as you attacked Russia and started this but you should have capitulated earlier and then this whole thing would have never happened.  

And so I just—I don’t think we know what in his deep, dark moments he actually has in mind when it comes to what happens to that 80 percent of Ukraine that is not yet occupied by Russia.  

SESTANOVICH: Let me just make one simple point here, reiterate what I said. 

Putin is not interested in a simple cease fire. If that’s what Trump thinks he’s going to accomplish through these negotiations, it will not be adequate from the Russian standpoint.  

So in a strange way the Russian ambitions are going to compel the administration to come up with a broader strategy to think through clearly what sort of end result we want, what endures, and that will require consultations with the Ukrainians. It will require consultations with our European partners.  

STARES: OK.  

KUPCHAN: Can I add one other thing to that? (Laughs.) 

I think the administration’s ability to scorn and reject consultation has not been fully tested yet. (Laughter.) 

So far the readiness to shatter norms of consultation, commitment to common purpose, shared resources, all that, in general they’ve leaned against—away from that so strongly that I’m not sure they will feel quite as compelled as Tom thinks to flesh out a fuller strategy for Ukraine’s future.  

STARES: OK. Thank you. Let’s move on.  

Hannah, do we want to go back to Anthony Borden?  

OPERATOR: We will take our next question from Dan Sagalyn.  

Q: Hi. Can you hear me now?  

STARES: Yeah. Go ahead, Dan. 

Q: So I want to follow up with what you got—I think what Charlie said but others feel free to chime in too, and that has to do with Poland. The foreign minister is coming to Washington. He’s going to be meeting with Rubio.  

Why is Poland equivocating on sending troops to Ukraine? How do you read that?  

KUPCHAN: You know, I think that Poland is uncomfortable doing something that they see as potentially detaching them from the United States.  

If the U.S. kind of steps forward and says, we’re in this together, we have your back, if Polish forces in Ukraine were to be targeted by Russians we will come to your rescue, I think there would be more comfort.  

But my read on the Polish position—and it is a bit inconsistent because they’ve been as forward leaning as any country when it comes to making the effort in Ukraine and their level of defense spending is much higher than most—I really think that, you know, they’re not—they don’t want to have a kind of Europe-only strategy and in some ways I think they’re trying to kind of jam Trump into keeping this within a NATO/transatlantic context.  

SESTANOVICH: Can I add one thing to that?  

Remember that the Poles have been very interested in getting the elaboration, a more—fuller elaboration of NATO infrastructure in Poland itself. In the first Trump administration they were talking about building Fort Trump. I expect to hear that again.  

My guess is that finding a formula, as Charlie suggests, that the United States supports could include a commitment of Polish forces. But they are especially interested because they aren’t so sure that that’s going to hold. They’re especially interested in making sure that Poland’s security is not jeopardized.  

STARES: All right. Next question? 

OPERATOR: We will take our next question from Steven Erlanger. 

Q: Yeah. Hi. I’m sorry I missed some of this because I was actually doing that horrible thing of eating dinner. But thank you all and, Tom, it’s nice to see you, and Steve as well, and Charlie I saw in Munich.  

Clearly, Trump doesn’t give a damn about Ukraine. He thinks it belongs to Russia. I think he thinks it’s in the way. It’s in the way of this larger relationship he imagines with Putin and that’s what I want to ask you about.  

What do you imagine this larger relationship with Putin is in Trump’s head and what does he want to do with it? Because I think part of that implies a willingness to talk about a new security architecture for Europe, which is what Putin wants. Trump seems to think the world is his hemisphere and Putin has his hemisphere and Xi Jinping has his hemisphere—I guess a triosphere.  

So I’m just curious whether you have thoughts—and, obviously, just thoughts—about what larger things Trump wants once he gets Ukraine sort of out of the way or off the table. Thank you all. 

STARES: Who would like to take that on? 

KUPCHAN: I mean, I can make a quick stab at it and then let Tom and Steve go.  

The one reflection that I would offer, Steve, is that there is a kind of unadorned, fierce transactionalism to everything that Trump is doing now that I think helps us understand his approach to foreign policy.  

You know, when it when it comes to Canada and Greenland and the Panama Canal this is just good old acquisitive, materialistic behavior. I think that he envisages getting access to a big chunk of Ukraine’s minerals that he reenters the United States into Russia’s fossil fuel market, that he wants to go out there and cut some kind of deal with Xi Jinping on trade. In some ways, you know, hey, let’s put geopolitics aside and get rich and build hotels in Gaza.  

And so I do think that there is just a very kind of materialistic—naively materialistic and transactional impulse here that is on show in almost every aspect of his policy. 

STARES: Either Tom or Steve? 

SESTANOVICH: I’ll add something to that. I think that’s too limited, Charlie, because in addition to the transactional element about which you’re surely right—this is a real estate developer, after all—there’s also the kind of vanity and psychological thrill of mixing it up with other big timers. I mean, remember the way in which—other big timers and tyrannical small timers. He likes them too. Remember the love affair with Kim Jong-un. This was something that Trump was invested in not simply for the transactional possibilities, but also because he really liked the, you know, the frisson of dealing with a person of this kind, and creating a unique personal tie. But the question is, will he be willing to walk away from that with Putin if he discovers he doesn’t get anything more than he got from Kim Jong-un?  

You know, Trump didn’t really look back, even though he kept the letters—(laughter)—on the relationship with Kim Jong-un, because it just wasn’t paying off for him. And he may discover that Putin has got ideas about the way in which he wants to define his relationship that are, you know, more than he can deliver or abide. You know, he’s going to hear some pretty weird-sounding lectures from Putin about his existential war with the West, that kind of thing. It may not go anywhere, so—and he’ll have to decide. You know, is the thrill of this great enough, or—to keep doing it? Or just, you know, forget Putin in the way that he forgot Kim Jong-un? 

STARES: Tom, I’m bringing you in here. You said you were just recently in Moscow. What do the Russians that you talk to, without naming names, think about this relationship between the two of them? That Trump seems to be in the thrall, or—I don’t know how to describe it—with Putin? And that there’s—and Putin’s clearly flattering him at every opportunity. Some would say playing him at every opportunity. How do the Russians that you’ve spoken to characterize this relationship? 

GRAHAM: It’s an interesting question. You know, obviously, they are quite pleased. I think Trump is perhaps the most pro-Russian president that we’ve had in decades, probably—perhaps ever. They see this as an opening. They believe that it’s a reflection of Putin’s own personality, and his strength, and his ability to present himself on the—on the global stage to Trump. But all that said, I mean, I did not find—and this was last week in Moscow—a great deal of optimism about where this relationship was going.  

For them, Trump is mercurial. He’s unpredictable. Some of the things that Steve mentioned are obviously at top of mind. It’s not clear that these guys are going to have a heart to heart and come to a common definition of what the transactional elements in this relationship will be. So I was surprised that there was a great deal more skepticism about where this thing was going to tend than you would get from simply listening to Russian propaganda or a lot of commentary here in the West. 

STARES: OK, Hannah. 

OPERATOR: We will take our next question from Evelyn Leopold. Evelyn, please accept the unmute prompt. 

Q: Can you hear me?  

STARES: Yeah, just speak up a little bit, please, Evelyn. 

Q: I will try. I will try.  

STARES: And if you could identify yourself, that would be helpful.  

Q: Yeah. Evelyn Leopold. U.N.-based journalist, freelancer. 

And I’m wondering, do we have any intelligent negotiators among the Trumpets who can in any way do a proper deal with the Russians? Secondly, I’m the daughter of parents who came United States in 1938. And regardless of what happens in Germany this week, do you see the Trumpets drawing themselves closer to the—to the AfD, Alternative für Deutschland? 

STARES: OK. Two questions there. 

GRAHAM: Could I—could I jump in on the first one?  

STARES: Yeah, I was going to say, Tom, and maybe, Charlie, you give us your sense about the German election, AfD’s chances, whether Vance’s comments either helped or hurt them. That would be particularly interesting to get your sense.  

GRAHAM: One of the concerns I heard in Moscow last week was, strangely enough, the lack of expertise on Russia-Ukraine in the United States, and in the administration specifically, and at the higher levels. So concern that they could sit down and begin a set of negotiations, and the people across the table from them will not really understand what they’re trying to say, what the—what the real motives are, the chances that the situation will be misread and they will not—the United States will not respond in the fashion that they want. This gets back to the point I’ve made. Ceasefire is not enough. They’ve been trying to drive that point home. They are still not persuaded that anybody on the American side understands that they want more than simply a simple ceasefire, and they want someone who has some knowledge of Russia, who has some knowledge of Ukraine, and enjoys the trust of the president to go in and tell him, got to do something else if you want to have a deal with the Russians. 

STARES: Tom, your nation is calling out for you.  

GRAHAM: Yeah, right. (Laughter.) 

SESTANOVICH: Can I add one thing—can I add one thing to that, Paul? Because I think, apart from lack of expertise on Russia, you actually have a top tier of people in the executive branch who haven’t served in the executive branch before, who have not been negotiators. You have former members of Congress, mostly—a senator is secretary of state. Members of—former members of Congress at CIA, DNI, NSC. At DOD we have a television personality. And so nobody who’s actually conducted negotiations. That is going to be as big a challenge as lack of expertise on Russia. 

GRAHAM: Right? And no one who’s ever conducted negotiations with the Russians, which takes a special talent, as you know Steve. 

SESTANOVICH: Yeah. 

KUPCHAN: On the second—the second issue, you know, I was puzzling as to why Vance gave the speech that that he gave. And one answer that came to mind was he was speaking to a domestic audience in the United States. But he doesn’t really need to speak to that audience in Munich. And the other is that I think the Trump administration is trying to do what they began during the first term, and that is to build a transnational network of far-right populist parties, that would include AfD, National Rally, Orbán, others, probably Meloni, whom I’m guessing is going to become further right wing with Trump in power than she—than she was with Biden in power.  

But I have to say that, you know, standing there, in that—in that room, I don’t know, we were a one or two miles from the beer hall where Hitler launched his putsch and started the whole movement that ended up bringing the Nazis to power. To have an American vice president say that, you know, Germans should embrace this party, whoa. It was a bone-chilling moment. 

STARES: OK. Next question. 

OPERATOR: We will take our next question from Martin Burcharth. 

Q: Yes. Hi. This is Martin Burcharth from the Danish newspaper Information. Hi, Stephen. H, Charlie. And hi, Tom.  

Tom, you were in Moscow last week. And you said something that really struck me, which is that the Russians would rather see, or would even demand in negotiations, that Ukraine obtain the status which would be similar to Belarus. Whereas I have been reading about them actually accepting that Ukraine would become part of the European Union. And Belarus is not a member of the European Union. So I would like to ask you, is that—is that just a story that’s running around about the EU and is just false?  

And, secondly, to Charlie and Stephen, about the security force. It’s a complicated affair, obviously. And I was thinking, and I was talking to people at the United Nations last week, about a peacekeeping force. And one of the advantages of having a peacekeeping force in Ukraine—I could see a lot of disadvantages as well. But one is that Russia would have a veto in the Security Council. So they will be part of forming, shaping that up, and they would be able to dictate certain things. And so that would give them kind of peace and quiet compared to a security force. What do you think about that? Thank you. 

STARES: Either you two or three gentlemen? 

GRAHAM: Yeah, let me just answer the first question that Martin asked. You know, the Russians have gone back and forth on EU membership for Ukraine over many years, and even during this conflict. My sense of where they are at this point is that, you know, they would prefer that that not happen. This idea of Ukraine integrating itself into the Euro-Atlantic community, even if it is initially on socioeconomic and political ways, runs contrary to what they think they might be able to get at this point. So it gets back to something that we’ve talked about with reference to the American side, which is why concede anything before you’ve gotten down into negotiations? That may be a card to play later on as you try to push the deal in a direction that is more favorable to you. But that’s certainly not something they’re going to concede at the outside of a serious negotiation. 

KUPCHAN: So, for reasons that both Tom and Steve have mentioned, I’m actually skeptical that we’re going to get a peace deal. I think we might get a ceasefire, which then leads to a frozen conflict. And that’s because what Russia sees as an acceptable end game and what Ukraine sees as an acceptable end game, I’m not sure there’s overlap there. And so I do think that we should prepare for something that looks a lot more like a frozen conflict than a lasting deal.  

And that brings me to your second question, Martin. I mean, I would not advocate for a European deterrent force on the ground in harm’s way if we get a ceasefire. I would argue in favor of something that is under a U.N. chapeau, that has troops there that are not European as well as European, that the Russians will buy into. Because I do think that if this is going to—if this is going to work, it has to be something that is—that is multilateralized, and that is something that all the parties on both sides can ultimately learn to live with. 

STARES: OK, I think we have time for one more question, Hannah. 

OPERATOR: We will take our last question from Laura Rozen. 

Q: Can you hear me? 

STARES: Yeah. Hi, Laura. 

Q: Thank you. Thank you so much for doing this.  

I’m not sure who best to ask, but I have a question about the Kremlin talking points we’ve heard Trump express, especially in the past few days—you know, that Zelensky only has a 4 percent approval rating. Where and from whom do you think Trump is hearing that? Is that Giuliani? Is that Musk? Is that Manafort? And, related on the question of Ukraine holding elections—which J.D. Vance said yesterday is now U.S. policy—does it seem there are some in Trump’s circle who are working to advise more Kremlin-friendly candidates? 

STARES: OK. Over to Tom and Steve. 

GRAHAM: I have no knowledge of any of that. I mean, where Trump is getting his information is a mystery to me. On the candidates Steve might have more insight into that than I do at this point. But, look, let me say, if they get to a ceasefire, if the Ukrainians do lift martial law, there will be elections. But that is not the sequence in which the Russians are thinking about this at this point. And that is a problem, from the standpoint of the Trump administration’s position right now. 

STARES: Steve. 

SESTANOVICH: (Laughs.) Tom is absolutely right. We have no idea where this 4 percent number came from. It may have been, you know, something he dreamt. 

About elections, though, because this is—this is important, it’s important because it delegitimizes the Ukrainian role and voice in any negotiations. It’s important also in a way that the administration may not have been ready for because it has unified Ukrainian political figures of all stripes in support of Zelensky, and they say it’s not just that—it’s not really that we’re supporting Zelensky; it’s that we’re supporting our democratic approach to governing ourselves. And so they’re going to—the administration is going to find that this is kind of a nonstarter except in the way that Tom mentions, which is that, you know, after martial law ends, of course, all of those political—Ukrainian political figures will be thirsting for the revival of political competition. I’ve heard many Ukrainian politicians say this: While martial law is in place and a war is on, we are united. Once we are back to political rivalry, we are—we’re going to undertake that rivalry in the full way that we’re used to in this country—and by the way, that you’re not used to in your country, Mr. Putin. 

STARES: OK. We are, sadly, out of time. We could clearly go on for much longer today. This has been a terrific conversation. I continue to be impressed by my colleagues on these issues. I’m sure this is not the last time we will be talking about this. And until then, thank you, everybody, and please look out for further information on the work we’re doing on Ukraine on CFR.org, particularly the page on Ukraine, the special initiative. 

With that, I will bring these—this discussion to a conclusion. Thank you again. 

KUPCHAN: Thank you, Paul. 

GRAHAM: Thank you, Paul. 

SESTANOVICH: Thanks, Paul. And everyone should read Paul and Michael O’Hanlon’s piece on post-conflict security arrangements for Ukraine. 

(END)