The Palestinians experienced a Nakba, but feel victorious

The Iron Swords War joins a series of conflicts in the history of the Israeli-Arab conflict that end in the rather complex situation of Israel reaping military successes and strategic achievements coupled with a sense of failure and bitterness. The Arab side, on the other hand, has taken severe blows and has come out the loser in military terms, but regards the war as a historic achievement – primarily since Israel was damaged and taken by surprise at its start, and that by its end Israel has not achieved a decisive victory.

This was the case in the 1956 Sinai Campaign when, like in the current war, Israel was pressured by the United States to withdraw from conquered territories and bring the conflict to an end. The same applies to the Yom Kippur War, the second intifada, Second Lebanon War and the 2014 Operation Protective Edge.

Arab collective memory regards these events as achievements resulting from sacrifice and the ability to absorb severe blows, exhibit steadfastness, (“sumud”), and make it impossible for Israel to declare decisive victory. This phenomenon shouldn’t lead Israel to conclude it has been defeated but must be understood so as to formulate sober goals and courses of action in dealing with enemies in the region.

There’s a sense of accomplishment in the Palestinian arena regarding signing the current Israel-Hamas agreement, centered around Hamas’ efforts to establish a narrative whereby, “On October 7, Netanyahu declared his goal of destroying Hamas, but after 15 months was forced to sign an agreement with it.” In other words, de facto recognizing Hamas as the dominant force in Gaza, for which no alternative exists. A similar sentiment is prevalent too among many Gazans who, despite unprecedented suffering caused by the ideological adventures afflicted by Sinwar, nonetheless, view the agreement, like October 7, as a national achievement.

There’s next to no soul-searching on the Palestinian side for the current war – or at all. Here and there, you might hear a voice critical of Hamas, primarily from Palestinian Authority officials but, like during the second intifada, focusing on the damage caused or the ill-judged policy, but not regarding the massacre carried out against Israelis. This lack of soul-searching is particularly striking when it comes to October 7: Most Palestinians believe the contention that it was an attack on military targets, not accompanied by war crimes. No prominent Palestinian intellectual, political leader or political analyst speaks of regret, shame or responsibility for the massacre.

For now, there are no signs of soul-searching concerning the price of the war. Responsibility for the carnage and destruction, described as a Nakba greater than that of 1948, is laid at Israel’s doorstep. This reflects a long-standing fundamental Palestinian flaw: a “bipolarity” with, on the one hand, fighting spirit and praise for the ability to harm Israel and, on the other, victimhood from the results of the war the Palestinians themselves started.

For decades, this pattern has been repeated by a defeated aggressor demanding compassion while, at the same time, refusing to show mercy. Many Palestinians cleave to the dichotomy of being “natives” who are always right, and are therefore permitted to resort to violence against a “colonial power” that is always satanic, opting for fantasy, slogans and “historical justice” over feasible solutions; insisting on turning back the wheels of history and, above all, evading self-criticism or the ability to demonstrate empathy toward Israelis, including civilians, invariably defined collectively as “settlers,” thereby constituting legitimate targets.

Understanding how Palestinians perceive the end of the war is essential for formulating sensible plans for the future. On October 7, the “conception” – supported by both the left and right – that radical elements, particularly those who have become sovereign, could be “tamed,” wasn’t the only thing to collapse. The notion that occupation lies at the root of the conflict, and that the solution is a Palestinian state, collapsed too.

The brutality and demonization exposed on October 7 stemmed from neither political repression nor economic deprivation, but rather from a religious and cultural animosity burning for years. The Palestinians refuse, or don’t want, to admit this. It’s important, however, that at least Israelis should recognize the grim truth. We should liberate ourselves from ideas championed by high-ranking Israeli officials about striving to “deradicalize the Palestinians, like in Germany and Japan” – a process possible only via soul searching, rather than external coercion.

A further insight that must be learned from October 7 – by Palestinians, but more importantly by Israelis – is that Hamas is not a traffic accident in Palestinian history borne of the lack of political negotiation or general distress. Hamas men aren’t “aliens,” estranged from the society in which they operate (like ISIS), but are rather an integral part of it, fused into it. They influence it, representing large parts of it, and reflect deep-seated trends within it. Such a body can’t be “erased,” as many have declared since October 7. Conversely, it must also be understood that there is no clear dichotomous divide between Hamas and the general public – an image that Hamas itself tries to manipulate the market.

The sense of Palestinian achievement emboldens Hamas’ position among Palestinians and the perception that exalts the ongoing struggle against Israel. The worst war in the history of the Israel-Arab conflict, in which tens of thousands of Gazans have been killed and the Gaza Strip has been destroyed, ended with unprecedented hostility and a burning desire for revenge toward Israelis – presumably one of Siwar’s goals for the war. Little wonder that almost no voices were sounded, either during or following the war, regarding the need to abandon the path of confrontation, let alone wake up, recognize and promote coexistence with Israel.

The obvious discrepancy in the two societies’ perception of the war further enhances the question as to whether dialogue can now be advanced, especially since one side is abstaining from self-criticism, and the other has a tendency toward self-flagellation. In such a situation, the discourse around a Palestinian state seems a like solution rather divorced from reality. That said, the idea of a single country from the river to the sea, is a dangerous fantasy that will only lead to a bloody Balkan situation between two people separated by a deep divide in terms of culture and values.

The two-state vision must be substituted by a sober parting of ways. The proposal of creating a physical buffer zone between the two peoples, which may be advanced unliterally since, for now at least, there’s no address on the Palestinian side willing to make historic concessions, less still market them to the public. This will entail defining physical borders in Gaza and Judea and Samaria, and ensuring that gates to the Palestinian entity, i.e., the Jordan River Valley and the Philadelphi Corridor, are never controlled by the Palestinians. There will clearly be a close economic and infrastructural connection between that entity and Israel and, to contain the volatile demographic and geographic scenario between the two peoples, the IDF will obviously need to constantly intervene to eliminate security threats.

This solution is far from ideal. However, compared to a single state or the situation carrying on as it is – it’s the lesser evil.

Dr. Michael Milshtein is the head of the Forum for Palestinian Studies at the Dayan Center of Tel Aviv University