The president has already failed to deliver one of his big foreign policy promises.

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President Donald Trump’s first week back in the White House sparked more drama than maybe any in history—the 70 executive orders, the pardons of 1,500 insurrectionists, the highly publicized raids and deportations. And then there were his opening moves in foreign policy, which wreaked their own kind of havoc.

But while his moves in domestic policy were expected—he’d promised them all through his reelection campaign—his moves on the world stage came largely as a surprise and portend capriciousness and chaos in the months ahead.

Even the one move that can be seen as a success in the short run—a standoff with the president of Colombia—may boomerang, to his and our detriment, in the long run.

The big promise Trump made in foreign policy was that he would end the Russia–Ukraine war “in 24 hours,” even before taking the oath of office. In fact, though, when he put his peace plan on the table, a few weeks after he won the election, Russian President Vladimir Putin rejected it out of hand. Last week, when Trump threatened to impose tariffs on Russian goods, Putin shrugged. (The U.S. imports almost nothing from Russia these days, so there’s almost nothing to tariff.)

It seems Trump thought he could get a quick and easy peace treaty because A) he’s the self-proclaimed master in “the art of the deal,” B) his predecessors were “totally inept” (as he said to a group of world leaders at Davos), and C) he “get[s] along” with Putin.

What he seems not to have realized (this was a pattern in his first term as well) is that A) dealing with world leaders is not the same as dealing with, say, the New York City Department of Buildings, B) his predecessors were not so inept (it’s just that this sort of thing is hard), and C) Putin’s interests when it comes to Ukraine don’t align with ours (they don’t even align with Trump’s), and, in matters of war and peace, interests outweigh (real or imaginary) friendships.

In the world’s other major war zone, the Middle East, one might think Trump would have spent the first week basking in his preinaugural triumph—the role his special envoy, Steve Witkoff, played in nailing down a ceasefire between Israel and Hamas that President Biden had put on the table eight months earlier. But instead, he made a series of remarks—whether planned or improvised, it was hard to tell—that disrupted not only the ceasefire but the array of U.S. partnerships with the region’s Sunni Arab nations.

First, the day after his return to power, Trump said in an interview that he was “not confident” the ceasefire would hold, adding, “It’s not our war, it’s their war”—seemingly unaware that once a country takes the lead in molding the beginnings of a peace treaty (especially when the U.S. does so, in cooperation with regional powers like Egypt and Qatar), it assumes a responsibility to monitor and guide the deal through its phases.

Then, over the weekend, Trump called Gaza a “demolition site” and suggested that “we just clean out that whole thing”—either temporarily or for the “long term”—adding that he would talk with the heads of Egypt and Jordan about taking in the territory’s 2 million Palestinian refugees.

He seemed unaware that Egypt and Jordan have long rejected suggestions that they take in more refugees than the many they already have. Their leaders, as well as those of Saudi Arabia and other Arab nations, with whom Trump wants to rekindle warm relations, denounced the idea in very strong terms.

Trump also seemed indifferent to the fact that the Gazans—still traumatized by their expulsion from Israeli territory back in 1948—have no desire for yet another forced relocation, especially since it would probably mean the end of any hopes for a Palestinian state.

Finally, his proposal mirrored the ethnic cleansing fantasies of Itamar Ben-Gvir and Bezalel Smotrich, the most right-wing members of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s governing coalition. (Both, in fact, celebrated Trump’s remarks.) Trump’s nominee to be U.S. ambassador to Israel, former Gov. Mike Huckabee, has made similar comments, denying that there are any “occupied territories” in Gaza or the West Bank, saying they all belong to Israel. To the extent Trump shares this view—and his remarks this weekend suggest he does—there is no way he will fulfill his dream of mediating “normalized” relations between Israel and Saudi Arabia.

Then there are the relations with our European allies. Trump churned tensions with the allies in his first term—raising doubts about his commitment to Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty (pledging to treat an attack on one member as an attack on all), threatening to pull out of NATO altogether, cozying up with Putin in a way that cast more doubt still on his allegiances.

He began his second term deepening these doubts and divisions. He threatened to impose tariffs on any EU country that didn’t manufacture goods inside the United States, announced he would impose tariffs on our closest NATO ally (Canada) in any event, and declared that the U.S. has an urgent national security need to purchase Greenland, warning Denmark—which controls the icy island nation’s foreign relations—that he would impose extra tariffs on its goods if it didn’t agree to sell.

Trump briefly raised the idea of buying Greenland in his first term and expressed shock—even calling off a planned visit to Copenhagen—when his offer was refused. This time around, he’s not backing down. He has held at least one reportedly tense phone conversation on the matter.

The whole thing is a puzzle. Greenland has some geostrategic importance, close as it lies to sea lanes, which Russia or China might exploit, from the melting Arctic into the Atlantic Ocean. But both Greenland and Denmark are NATO allies; the U.S. has a major military base in Greenland, with full access to its resources and no limits on its operations. There’s no need to own the place.

His obsession has amplified the looming apprehensions of all the European nations. Trump brusquely says he will “get Greenland,” one way or another. NATO allies are treaty-bound to defend one another from outside attack. What are they to do in the event of an inside attack?

Finally, there is Trump’s one apparent success. On Saturday, as part of his mass-deportation campaign, Trump ordered the U.S. military to fly two planeloads of Colombian immigrants back to Colombia. Colombian President Gustavo Petro—who had accepted U.S. civilian planes full of returning migrants—refused to let the planes land, objecting to news footage showing the migrants shackled while boarding the planes. Trump threatened to impose 25 percent tariffs on Colombian goods unless Petro let the planes through. Petro threatened a counter-tariff. Trump held firm, saying he would double the tariffs if Petro didn’t back down. Petro backed down.

“Today’s events make clear to the world that America is respected again,” boasted a statement released Sunday night by the White House. The clear message was that other countries should take the standoff as a lesson—especially Denmark (in calculating whether to sell Greenland), Panama (whether to give us back the canal), Russia (on negotiating over Ukraine), or even Canada (could he really have been serious about making it the 51^st state?).

But Trump may be miscalculating. Colombia is a tiny country, with one-sixth of our population and 1.5 percent of our GDP, that depends on the U.S. for one-third of its exports (mainly crude oil, coffee, and cut flowers). Trump will find he has less leverage—and the objects of his wrath have more freedom to maneuver—in future faceoffs.

Finally, Trump’s hardball approach may wind up being counterproductive. One lesson some leaders might take from the Colombia standoff is that when Trump tells them to jump, they should ask only how high. However, another lesson might be that they need to reduce their dependence on America.

Shannon O’Neil, Latin America specialist and director of studies at the Council on Foreign Relations, told me on Monday that many countries south of the border are “already searching for alternatives.” The Mercosur nations—Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay, and Paraguay—signed an agreement with the EU. Mexico is bolstering its ties with the EU as well. China has long been making inroads in the region, including in Colombia. It has alienated many with its own hardball methods, roping them into trade arrangements that undercut their own local industries—but the experience with Colombia could spur the region’s leaders to turn away from Washington as well, and Beijing’s agents will now exploit this impulse with special enthusiasm.

Trump may soon learn that his brand of America First means America Alone, and that doesn’t help America at all.